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I. Introduction
This article deals with the evolution and status of the
international law doctrine of sovereign immunity. The doctrine
Par in parem non habet imperium ("An equal has no power over
an equal")' provides that sovereigns are equal as juridical bodies
and have no authority to use their own courts to sue other
sovereigns without the consent of the latter.2 This doctrine is an
old concept in international law. It initially appeared to endorse an
absolutist form of sovereignty, which implied an over-simplified
view of the role of sovereigns in a global setting. From an early
period, scholars and judges felt that over-extending the doctrine
would result in the denial of legitimate legal rights and duties.
Still, the doctrine carried a strong imprimatur of impermeability.
This is in part due to the historical context of the general
I BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1673 (7th ed. 1999).
2 See Lee Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of
the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 741, 748 (2003); see also Svrine
Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs.
149, 150 (2011).
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development of the sovereignty principle in international law and,
particularly, the emergence of legal positivism, which appeared to
provide a strong doctrinal foundation for an absolutist view on the
concept of sovereignty. This jurisprudential assumption
influenced the emergence of sovereign immunity as well.
The customary international law principle (or rule)3 of
sovereign immunity-also called jurisdictional immunity-has its
roots in treaties, domestic statutes, state practice, and the writings
of juris consults.4 The principle is based on the theory that the
sovereign has an exclusive monopoly on law-making. For this
reason, the legal theorist John Austin denied that international law
purporting to bind the sovereign was law at all.' In short, the
classical understanding was that a sovereign ceased to be
sovereign if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of a
foreign government. Early in American legal history, Chief
Justice Marshall famously propounded that sovereign immunity
was based on the "perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns."'
The problem addressed in this article is that the classical,
nineteenth century view of sovereignty, and the theory that
supports it, does not provide a concept of sovereign immunity
from the jurisdiction of another state's courts that adequately
incorporates competing and complementary principles and
doctrines of international law. The central question is whether the
3 "Rule" may be a loaded tenn to describe jurisdictional immunity. Finke
describes it instead as a principle of international law. Jasper Finke, Sovereign
Immunity: Rule, Comity, or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 853, 857, 872-878
(2010) ("The distinction between rule and principle is more than a mere formality. It
determines how we approach the matter and which questions we ask, because a
principle, in contrast to a specific rule, allows states to determine the scope of sovereign
immunity within their domestic legal orders confined by the limits set by international
law."). Nevertheless, jurisdictional immunity is generally referred to as a rule in court
cases and most literature. Rule, principle, and doctrine are used interchangeably in this
paper.
4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATE FROM JURISDICTION To ADJUDICATE: THE BASIC
RULE § 451 (1987).
5 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVrNCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 144
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).
6 Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
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evolution of the international law doctrine of sovereignty itself has
generated a concept of rational limitations on the use of sovereign
immunity (which is but a specific application of sovereignty).
Further, do these limitations suggest that the traditional customary
international law of sovereign immunity has evolved so as to limit
the absoluteness of its reach? Additionally, does this limitation
constitute a rule of customary international law standing on its
own? This article maintains that it does. To justify the existence
of such a customary international law modification of
jurisdictional immunity, this article carefully reviews the evolution
of theory and practice from the nineteenth century into the twenty-
first century, considering changing expectations as to what is
considered customary international law. This focus raises critical
issues that relate to the foundational values of modern
international law. Moreover, this article explores the evolution of
the general sovereignty idea in international law as well as the
development of jurisprudential theory supporting it. This will
show that the sovereignty of relative antiquity is a vastly different
concept from the contemporary theory under U.N. Charter
expectations. In short, an un-amended nineteenth century view of
sovereign immunity would serve to undermine some of the most
important expectations in international law in the twenty-first
century.
This article additionally discusses the changing nature of
jurisdictional immunity for sovereign states' in light of the rising
importance of jus cogens principles-fundamental rules of
international law "from which no derogation is permitted."' In the
7 The status of statehood is important for the question of jurisdictional immunity,
because without statehood, a political entity (such as Taiwan or Palestine) may not be
afforded all of the privileges and powers of a state, including immunity. See MALCOLM
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (5th ed. 2003) (describing the Montevideo Convention
on Rights and Duties of States, which provides the generally accepted elements of
statehood: a permanent population, defined territory, a government, and the capacity to
enter into relations with other states).
8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (9th ed. 2009); see Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating "a peremptory
norm ... is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted. . . .") [hereinafter V.C.L.T.];
see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-63 (4th ed.
2003) ("Jus cogens is a norm thought to be so fundamental that it even invalidates rules
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last decade especially, a number of events have had a profound
impact on the changing nature of sovereign immunity and how it
is understood in the context of complementary international law
principles such as jus cogens. This article shows that both the
emerging application ofjus cogens principles in the area of human
rights and humanitarian law generally clearly place limits on state
sovereignty and sovereign immunity.' Juridically, the most
important development was the assertion of jursidiction over
Germany by the Italian Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation)o
in civil cases, brought by individual plaintiffs, for human rights
violations that occurred during the Second World War." In
response, Germany initiated proceedings in the International Court
of Justice (ICJ).12 In February 2012, the ICJ issued its judgment in
the case of Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.
Italy: Greece Intervening), ruling that: (1) Italy violated
international law in asserting jurisdiction over Germany for jus
cogens abuses and (2) at the time there was no such exception
recognized in customary international law.' However, the
decision was not unanimous; it was contested and strong dissents
were written. 14
The legal analysis the ICJ employed in Jurisdictional
drawn from treaty or custom. Usually, a jus cogens norm presupposes an international
public order sufficiently potent to control states that might otherwise establish contrary
rules on a consensual basis.").
9 See infra Part III.B.
10 A court of cassation (literally, "Court of Cancellation") is the highest appellate
court in a state. In the United States the court of cassation is called the Supreme Court.
11 See, e.g., Ferrini v. Republica Federale di Germania, Cass. XX un. 11 marzo
2004 n. 5044, reprinted in 128 I.L.R. 658. Ferrini Judgment No. 5044/2044, 11 March
2004, Rivista di diritto internazionale 87 (2004), 539; English translation: 128 I.L.R.
658.
12 See Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Germany Institutes Proceedings
Against Italy for Failing to Respect Its Jurisdictional Immunity as a Sovereign State
(Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/14925.pdf;
Application Instituting Proceedings, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.,
Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143 (Dec. 23, 2008).
13 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143 (Feb. 3).
14 See id (seperate opinions of Judge Cangado Trindade; Judge Yusuf, Judge Ad
Hoc Gaja), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?
pl=3&p2=3&k=60&case=143&code=ai&p3=4.
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Immunities of the State was not comprehensive and was somewhat
incomplete. In determining the state of customary international
law, the ICJ erred in focusing myopically on the jurisprudence of
national courts. This article maintains that the ICJ should have
analyzed jurisdictional immunity using a comprehensive approach,
incorporating modem methods of legal analysis, including the use
of modem communications theory as applied to international
law.'" International law is not created in the same way as domestic
law. There is no international legislature, and few cases are
decided by international courts.16  Customary international law
should not be understood within the framework of state practice
and opinio juris alone. It must be understood within a framework
that takes into account what members of the global community
(states, courts, interest groups, scholars, legislatures, individuals,
etc.) are communicating about their collective understanding on
the limits, nature, and applicability of customary international law.
Many of the most important changes to sovereignty generally,
and sovereign immunity specifically, appear at first to be
anecdotal rather than developed with sophisticated analytical
methods of exposition and analysis. If international customary
law is approached in the broader context of the global social,
power, and constitutive process, the tools of Modem
Communications Theory may be utilized to place the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in the context of a comprehensive framework.
This article intends to demonstrate that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity properly contextualized will provide a more realistic
exposition of its status in international law, placed at the apex of
the evolving trend lines of international legal development. Such
an interpretation, this article suggests, will provide a more realistic
picture of the scope of sovereign immunity today. The approach
15 See generally W. Michael Reisman, International Law-making: A Process of
Communication, Luncheon Address at Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture 102 (Apr.
24, 1981) [hereinafter Reisman, International Law-making], available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1719&context=fss_pape
rs ("Formal law bodies ... emit communications that have the form of law but ... are
not law[]."); see also Myres McDougal & Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function
in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 249 (1980) [hereinafter McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function].
16 A list of the few ICJ's cases are available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?pl= 3&p2=2.
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considers domestic courts and diverse international fora, the works
of juris consults, and ultimately, the U.N. Charter itself. A
contextualized doctrine of sovereign immunity frees the analysis
of the scope and reach of sovereign immunity from being sealed in
its own self-created doctrinal boundaries and places it in the
broader environment of international lawmaking, including
international constitutional law, human rights law, as well as
developments in related fields of international law. The analysis
of jurisdictional immunity within the context of the U.N. Charter
is paramount.
It is appropriate to underscore the salience of trends in practice
from Nuremburg and the growth of international courts, which
have established the principle that an individual cannot claim
immunity from war crimes and other grave violations of human
rights." A state is a mere vessel by which individuals act in
aggregate. If an individual cannot claim the protections of
sovereignty when they abuse sovereign privileges and powers by
engaging in international crimes, then a state should also lose the
protections of sovereign immunity when the doctrine is used as the
means to engage in those same international wrongs or to avoid
responsibility. Ultimately, the critical question is whether the
changes in sovereignty and developments in jus cogens provide a
foundation for the emergence of a rule of customary international
law that requires a restricted version of sovereign immunity.
This article will show that in Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State, the ICJ ignored both the changing nature of sovereignty in
general and the pivotal role of jus cogens norms in international
law, and gave scant significance to the writings of learned
scholars. In international law, the writings of scholars can have
legal significance, even within the ICJ's statutory framework,
because the statute of the ICJ explains that: "The Court, whose
function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply . . . the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists . . .. "" As the U.S. Supreme
17 See Arrest Warrant of I1 April 2002 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J.
121 (Feb. 14); see also R. v. Bow St. Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827
(H.L.) (U.K.).
18 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(d), 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
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Court held in 1900:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of
labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly
well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such
works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to
be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.'9
Moreover, the ICJ formed its conclusions in Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State narrowly, and clearly left open the
possibility for further development on the scope of the rule of
jurisdictional immunity in the future.20 International law is not a
reified cake of dogma. It is constantly evolving and adapting to
secure its value orientation. This means that, although the ICJ has
now ruled on the current scope of immunity, the issue is far from
settled.
Among the most important developments directly relevant to
jurisdictional immunity is the changing nature of sovereignty in
general, discussed in Part II of this article. Part III considers
several parallel doctrines of immunity and the specific application
of sovereignty in the context of these doctrines. Part IV moves
into a discussion of the historical development of the rule of
immunity and how it was applied to changing forms of state
interaction. In addition to scholarship, sovereign immunity is a
product of domestic statutes, treaties, and case law. The next three
parts address those topics in turn. Part V examines domestic
statutes, paying particular attention to the U.S. statutory regime for
immunities of foreign states. Part VI discusses the various
19 The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1895)).
20 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening), 2012
I.C.J. 143, 1 65 (Feb. 3) ("The Court considers that it is not called upon in the present
proceedings to resolve the question whether there is in customary international law a
'tort exception' to State immunity applicable to actajure imperii in general. The issue
before the Court is confined to acts committed on the territory of the forum State by the
armed forces of a foreign State, and other organs of State working in co-operation with
those armed forces, in the course of conducting an armed conflict"); id at $ 91
(emphasizing that the court was propounding upon the law as it "presently stands").
382 [Vol. XXXVIII
RESTRICTIONS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
international treaties addressing immunity, and Part VII examines
state and international cases that have dealt with the interplay
between jus cogens violations and jurisdictional immunity. Part
VIII more deeply examines the recent ICJ decision in the case
concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State. Part IX
analyzes the legal and policy justifications for forum states to
waive immunity for jus cogens violations.
This article ultimately concludes that the conceptual
foundation of the U.N. Charter contains a premise that requires
state acceptance of the duty to cooperate in fulfilling obligations
under the U.N. Charter, which may include denying immunity to
foreign states. The imposition of rational limitations on
sovereignty and sovereign immunity are supported by legal
scholarship, the understanding of the historical context of
immunity, and the necessity to reconcile immunity with jus cogens
norms. These conclusions are summarized in Part X.
An important theme that pervades this article is the
clarification of how customary international law, and international
law generally, is made and applied. This article seeks to provide
additional guidance about the development of customary
international law using the tools of Modern Communications
Theory and a clearer explication of the prescribing process in
international law.
II. The Foundations of Communications Theory and the
Prescription and Application of International Law
It would be useful at this point to briefly describe the Modern
Communications Theory, so that sovereign immunity may be
placed in a proper, coherent context, rather than being analyzed as
a self-contained, isolated doctrine. The Modern Communications
Theory was initially developed by scholars of the New Haven
School of Jurisprudence.2 1 In the context of international law, the
theory provides that communications (collective understandings of
what the expectations of international law are) must be viewed in
terms of the context in which they are made. They must also be
21 See Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell & Michael Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403, 415 (1967);
McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function, supra note 15, at 250.
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viewed in terms of the authoritative and controlling decision
makers prescribing and applying these juridical communication
signals.22 It is necessary for the interpreter to consider the
aggregate of communications of the relevant communicators and
the target audience of communicates.23 What this means
practically, in the context of international law, is that courts
adjudicating problems of sovereign immunity cannot take into
account only the consent and practice of states themselves. The
courts must also account for a larger flow of communication
signals emanating from a multitude of stakeholder participants in
the global community and how, in the aggregate, this realistically
contributes to the making and application of international law.
Harold Lasswell summarized his understanding of the
Communications Theory into six essential questions: "who, says
what, [about what], in which channel, to whom, with what
effect?" 24
The "who" focuses on the character of the participants who
initiate the communications; "what" examines the content of the
communications; "about what" further refines the context of the
content; "in which channel" examines the mediums and methods
used to transmit the communications; "to whom" focuses on the
targeted recipient of the communication; and "with what effect",
finally, explores the impacts of the collective communications.2 5
In the context of international law, the "who" is of importance.
The communicators of international law are not states alone, but
other stakeholders as well. This article will show that the "who" is
much broader in scope than that which the ICJ has chosen to
consider. The "what" reflects expectations evolving on the limits
to sovereign immunity (the "about what"). These groups have
22 For a more in depth discussion of the Modem Communications Theory
approach to international law, see Winston Nagan & Craig Hammer, Communications
Theory and World Public Order: The Anthropomorphic, Jurisprudential Foundations of
International Human Rights, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 725, 757 (2007) [hereinafter Nagan &
Hammer, Communications Theory].
23 Id
24 Harold Lasswell, The Structure and Function of Communication in Society, in
THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES 37, 37 (Lyman Bryson ed.,
1964).
25 Nagan & Hammer, Communications Theory, supra note 22, at 762.
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used the "channels" of jurisprudence, advocacy, expectations, and
actions. These communications have been directed at the
international community, states, courts, and the ICJ (the "to
Whom"). Although the ICJ has presently endorsed an expansive,
deferential concept of jurisdictional immunity,2 6 the ultimate
"effect" of these communications is, as of yet, uncertain.
Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman clarified the law-
making or prescriptive function of international law, based on the
conceptual foundations of the general communications model
summarized above. Here, prescription is a complex interplay of
emerging expectations from diverse sources. These complex
expectations emerge in the form of prescription or policy and are
communicated to the larger target audience. The prescriptions are
communicated with the imprimatur of an authority signal as well
as a signal indicating an element of efficacy or controlling
intention. The following summarizes the model as applied to
international law":
Figure 1: McDougal Reisman Framework of International
Lawmaking
policy content
Comnunicators authority signal Target Audience
control intention
When these communications are generated and distributed to
the target audience-jurists, transnational courts, state courts
applying international law, and the ICJ-the active decision
makers must then analyze and develop three sequential phases of
the prescriptive process to effectively make and apply
international law:
26 See infra Part VII.
27 McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Function, supra note 15, at 250.
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(1) The first phase is to ascertain expectations about content,
authority and control. As McDougal and Reisman
explained:
This task requires a genuine effort to achieve the closest
possible approximation to the effective aggregate
general community expectation about the content,
authority, and control of alleged prescriptive
communications. The adequate performance of this task
demands a disciplined systematic survey and assessment
of all features of the process of communication and its
context that may affect expectation.28
(2) Decision makers must then supplement incomplete and
ambiguous communications. McDougal and Reisman
explained this component as requiring "the remedying of
the inevitable gaps and ambiguities in prescriptive
expectation by reference to more general, basic community
policies about shaping and sharing of values." 29 This will
be particularly important in Part VI as the ambiguous
provisions contained in various treaties on sovereign
immunity are addressed.
(3) The final phase involves integrating expectations and basic
community policies.30
This [final] task requires decision-makers or other
evaluators, recognizing that they are responsible for the
total policy of the community which they represent or of
which they are members, to reject even the most
explicitly, precisely formulated expectations when such
expectations are inimical to basic, more intensely
demanded community policies. This task is made
authoritative with respect to international agreements
[by]... jus cogens....
In short, international jurists must consider sovereign
immunity alongside and within the context of general international
law expectations, including the protection and promotion of the
28
29
30
31
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id
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most important fundamental values upon which the system is
based. These values include humanitarian law, human rights law,
and the jus cogens aspects of international law.
III. Sovereignty32
Jurisdictional immunity derives its legal life from the
generalized status of sovereignty in international law. It is
therefore necessary to place the doctrine of sovereign immunity
within the context of the evolution of the doctrine of sovereignty
itself.
A. Sovereignty in Historical Thought and Context
The doctrine of sovereignty has evolved from ideas of
sovereign absolutism to a focus on the foundations of its
legitimacy, rooted in the idea of "we the peoples."3 3 Because of
this shift of doctrinal focus, sovereignty is now a component of a
broader world constitutive process. This development places
important boundaries on sovereignty; some of the boundaries
strengthen it, while some weaken it. The outcome depends on
whether the problems sovereignty confronts strengthen or weaken
the fundamental value foundation upon which modern
international law is based.
Successive legal and political philosophers have explored the
theoretical underpinnings of sovereignty. Collectively, these
scholars provide the classical framework for understanding
sovereignty.3 4 The French political theorist Jean Bodin (1530-
32 See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 291
(7th ed. 2008) ("[The term sovereignty is] used to describe the legal competence which
states have in general, to refer to a particular function of this competence, or to provide a
rationale for a particular aspect of the competence. This jurisdiction, including legislative
competence over national territory, may be referred to in the terms 'sovereignty' or
'sovereign rights'. Sovereignty may refer to the power to acquire title to territory and the
rights accruing from exercise of the power. The correlative duty of respect for territorial
sovereignty, and the privileges in respect of territorial jurisdiction, referred to as
sovereign or state immunities, are described after the same fashion. In general
'sovereignty' characterizes powers and privileges resting on customary law and
independent of the particular consent of another state.") (internal citations removed).
33 U.N. Charter Preamble.
34 For a more detailed survey of the theoretical foundations of sovereignty
contributed by Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius, Moser, Martens, Austin, and others, see
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1596) was one of the first to provide a coherent conceptual
grounding for sovereignty." Bodin's contribution laid the
foundation for sovereign absolutism by supporting the
concentration of power in a monarch. Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1670) believed that a strong sovereign is necessary to keep man
from abusing his fellow neighbor (Homo homini lupus est, "Man
to Man is an arrant Wolfe").36 In Hobbes's view, a strong
sovereign is part of a social contract whereby individuals
acquiesce in the transfer of political and legal power to a
sovereign. In return, the sovereign protects his subjects from their
fellow man and from foreign invasion. The influence of Bodin
and Hobbes was reflected in the Peace of Westphalia" in 1648,
which ended decades of religious warfare in Europe and ushered
in a sovereign-dominated paradigm of political and legal process."
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), perhaps the most insightful and
enduring scholar of classical international law, maintained that the
sovereign powers envisioned by Hobbes have limits; Grotius
insisted that the exercise of sovereignty must be reasonable.3 9 He
was "fully convinced ... that there is a common law among
nations, which is valid alike for war and in peace . . ."40 Grotius
generally Winston P. Nagan & Aitza H. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, 13
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 429 (2012) [hereinafter Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty].
35 See JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: SIx BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 40
(M.J. Tooley trans., Alden Press 1955) (1576), available at
http://www.constitution.orgbodin/bodin.txt (providing in-depth analysis of the "true
attributes" of sovereignty).
36 See THOMAS HOBBES, DECIVE 2 (Kessinger Publishing Reprints 2004) (1651),
available at http://www.constitution.org/th/decive.txt; see also, THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., 3d ed. 1966) (1660), available at
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-contents.html.
37 Peace of Westphalia (1648),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th century/westphal.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
38 See generally DEREK CROXTON & ANusCHKA TISCHER, THE PEACE OF
WESTPHALIA: A HISTORICAL DICTIONARY (Greenwood Press 2002) (chronicling the
historical background of the Thirty Years' War, which resulted in the Treaty and
Congress of Westphalia that introduced the standards for our contemporary international
political system).
39 See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (DE JURE BELLI AC
PACIS) (Francis Kelsey trans., Carnegie 1925) (1625) (asserting that laws and social
contracts are not binding on individuals unless they are reasonable).
40 Id. at Prol. § 28.
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did much to contribute to the notion that there is a discoverable
body of natural law and principles, such as those that would justify
war in self-defense, or what is today implicated in jus cogens
norms. Grotius's views were heavily influenced by theology.4 1 In
his view, natural laws are the product of divine providence. As the
late ICJ Justice, Hersch Lauterpacht, wrote,
The significance of the law of nature in [Grotius's] treatise is
that it is the ever-present source for supplementing the voluntary
law of nations, for judging its adequacy in the light of ethics and
reason, and for making the reader aware of the fact that the will
of states cannot be the exclusive or even, in the last resort, the
decisive source of the law of nations.42
B. The Grotian approach has endured and its spirit
permeates the law of the U.N. Charter.
Johann Jakob Moser (1701-1785) and Georg Friedrich von
Martens (1756-1821) further contributed to the theoretical
foundations of sovereignty and international law, but from a
positivist approach.43 They disagreed with Grotius's assertion that
international law is based in morality and natural law, and instead
argued that what matters is what sovereigns do and how
sovereigns act (today referred to as custom), and the agreements
and treaties they enter into with each other.4 4 Finally, John Austin
(1790-1859) concluded that law simply is what the sovereign says
41 See generally id
42 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1, 21-22 (1946), cited in Adam C. Belsky, Mark Merva & Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Expecption to Immunity for Violations of
Peremptory Norms ofInternational Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 365, 382 (1989).
43 See generally JOHANN JAKOB MOSER, GESAMMLETE LIEDER: So ZUM THEIL
SCHON VORMALS GEDRUCKT, ZUM THEIL ABER BISHERO NOCH UNGEDRUCKT GEWESEN,
MIT GEDOPPELTEN REGISTERN (emphasizing postivism in religious texts as an allegory to
its relevance to sovereignty); see also GEORG FRIEDRICH VON MARTENS, THE LAW OF
NATIONS: BEING THE SCIENCE OF NATIONAL LAW, COVENANTS, POWERS & C.; FOUNDED
UPON THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF MODERN NATIONS IN EUROPE (4th ed. 1815)
(analyzing the sovereignty of the European states by examining the consequences of
each nation's laws and rights, and the relationships between those nations); Nagan &
Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 451.
44 Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 451.
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it is, as long as it can be enforced by sanctions.45 Austin
essentially viewed law with a scientific, objective analysis. He
insisted upon scientifically stating what law actually is. In this
view, norms, values, and morality are natural law-unscientific
and not objectively ascertainable. The nineteenth century
international lawyer Holland, influenced by the positivist view,
stated that international law is the "vanishing point of
jurisprudence."4 6
The early twentieth century witnessed a greatly expanded
deference to the prerogatives of sovereigns, which was supported
by the theoretical underpinnings of these legal theorists, especially
Austin.47 One of the results of this deference was the idea that a
sovereign (often in the form of a nation-state by this time) had no
clear limits on its exercise of power.48 This vigorous manifestation
of sovereignty contributed to the tragedy of World War I, because
one state had no legal authority to check another sovereign's
aggression short of war.49  Despite the excesses absolute
sovereignty fostered, during the peace negotiations following
World War I, the limits of sovereignty were not seriously
contested.50 For a fleeting moment, it appeared that the League of
Nations would impose some restraints on sovereigns. The League,
as Woodrow Wilson envisioned it, would require partial
relinquishment of sovereign omnipotence to the international
community, but this notion was subsumed by the emergence of the
unanimity rule for the League." If even a single member-state
objected to the action of the League, the organization could not
act.52 Additionally, the League of Nations was handicapped from
the outset by the absence of the United States, and it collapsed
45 See AuSTIN, supra note 5, at 143.
46 Sir THOMAS HOLLAND, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (Clarnedon Press,
Oxford, 1933).
47 See Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 451.
48 Id. at 453.
49 Id
50 Id
51 League of Nations Covenant art. 15, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dd8b9854.html.
52 Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 453.
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with the outbreak of the Second World War.5 3
The importance of sovereignty in international law in this era
was reflected in the often cited Lotus Case of 1926.54 In this case,
the Permanent Court of International Justice, predecessor to the
ICJ, established an influential rule that, as international law was
then understood, "restrictions upon the [sovereignty] of States
cannot therefore be presumed.""5 In short, a state was bound by
international law only by consent or a clear rule of custom.
Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler took the idea of absolute
sovereignty to its most extreme: the legal justification for total
war.16 According to Nazi ideology, under the veil of sovereignty,
"there was the implicit claim that there were no rules from the law
of war that could constrain the prerogatives of the sovereignty.""
War-making, after all, was one of the most basic and traditional
roles of sovereigns." The massive devastation wrought by the
Second World War, including some 60 million deaths, gave
urgency to attempts to develop rational constraints on sovereign
action."
C. Sovereignty in the Modern (i.e., U.N.) Era
As Judge Kaufman noted in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala6 0 "spurred
first by the Great War, and then the Second, civilized nations have
banded together to prescribe acceptable norms of international
behavior. From the ashes of the Second World War arose the
53 See generally FRANCIS PAUL WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1986) (detailing the political success and ultimate failure of the League of Nations).
54 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
55 Id. T 44.
56 See generally Tomislav Zelic, The Paradox of Sovereignty in Modem German
History Plays (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University), available at
http://gradworks.umi.com/3348441.pdf
57 See Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 455.
58 See, e.g., id. (discussing power struggles and the wars they create between
sovereigns).
59 See generally MARTIN GILBERT, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE
HISTORY (Rev. ed., 2004) (1989) (detailing the various government actions several
nations took during World War II, which eventually inspired debate on limiting
sovereign immunity).
60 Filartiga v. Pena-trala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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United Nations Organization, amid hopes that an era of peace and
cooperation had at last begun." 6 1 The U.N. Charter is a direct
response to Nazi atrocities and to a perceived need to constrain the
absolute autonomy and sovereignty of states in the interest of
peace.62  During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt
asserted that the war should not be fought for cynical reasons;
there must be some higher cause than simply defeating the Axis
powers. 63 To this end, he framed the allied war effort as a war to
secure the Four Freedoms: the freedom of conscience and belief,
the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom from want, and
the freedom from fear.64  These principles were adopted by
Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in the Atlantic Charter, which
became the basic framework of the U.N. Charter.6 5
The U.N. Charter, along with various international documents
66that give it flesh, is seen today as our international constitution.
In the modern era of the U.N. system of state interdependence and
obligation, the doctrine of the Lotus case has become
anachronistic. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the U.N.
Charter "is an instrument by which members both assert [their
sovereignty] and limit their sovereignty."6 For example, the U.N.
Charter stipulates that the "[o]rganization is based on the principle
of sovereign equality of all its [member states]." 68 This principle
is consistent with the strong (Lotus) version of sovereignty and
carries the implication of immunity from other sovereign's courts.
61 Id. at 890.
62 See generally STEPHEN SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 29 (2004) (discussing the motivations behind the U.N. Charter,
especially influenced by the "growing atrocities overseas").
63 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941).
64 Id
65 SCHLESINGER, supra note 62, at 31.
66 See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, 41
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53, at 186 (1986); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217(Ill)A, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(Ill), at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948); see generally
Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 61
(1989), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.eduIpilr/voll/iss1/3.
67 Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 459.
68 U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 1.
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However, this provision cannot be read in isolation. The U.N.
Charter has broader obligations and these obligations require some
subordination of sovereignty in general to the purposes and
principles (the basic values) of the U.N. Charter.69
The U.N. system redefines sovereignty by transferring some
powers away from individual states to the collective international
system and also requires restraints on the exercise of sovereignty.
For example, the U.N. Charter states that membership in the U.N.
is open only to "peace-loving" states (though that should not be
read as pacifist states)."o A significant limitation on sovereignty is
found in Chapter I, Article 2(4), which requires that "all Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations."
The U.N. Charter further mandates the transfer of some
sovereign powers to the General Assembly.7 2 The U.N. General
Assembly, the main constitutive body of nation-states, has the
authority to investigate almost anything, imposing a degree of
transparency and scrutiny on states." Even more significant
powers are transferred from states to the Security Council.74 Only
the Security Council, for example, can legally authorize the use of
force for purposes other than self-defense.7 ' The Security Council
also has the power to
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
69 See generally U.N. Charter (upholding at least four essential human freedoms:
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear).
70 Id at Ch. II, art. 4.
71 Id at Ch. II, art. 2, 14.
72 See generally id at Ch. IV (granting the General Assembly supreme authority to
pass binding resolutions).
73 Id. at Ch. IV, art. 10.
74 See id at Ch. V.
75 U.N. Charter Ch. VII, art. 42. One might view this transfer of power as
reminiscent of Hobbes's social contract theory: the world community has transferred
powers to the Security Council, and in return, the Security Council pledges to uphold
world peace and security.
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measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of
76diplomatic relations.
Further, the U.N. Charter imposes certain obligations on
member-states and raises the importance of the individual vis-d-vis
the state. A major purpose of the U.N. Charter is the advancement
of human rights.7 7 The heightened sense of the importance of the
individual in international law and relations under the U.N.
Charter system is reflected in its preamble, which begins with the
words, "We the Peoples of the United Nations determined. ... "78
Elsewhere, it has been argued that this language suggests that "the
peoples of the world are the ultimate source of international
authority," not the states.79 Judge Weeramantry made this point in
his dissenting opinion in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, where he argued that the
people's "collective will and desire is the very source of the
United Nations Charter and that truth should never be permitted to
recede from view." 80
Judge Weeramantry further contended in his dissent that six
keynote precepts are expressed in the preamble of the U.N.
Charter, of which the first is this notion that the peoples of the
world, and not the sovereigns, are the ultimate sources of authority
and judicial legitimacy in the world.8 ' The second keynote
principle of the Charter refers to "the determination of those
76 Id. at Ch. VII, art. 41.
77 See infra Part VIII.
78 U.N. Charter, Preamble heading; see also Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra
note 34, at 461 (describing how F.M. Frank and F. Patel have explained that the idea that
the authority under the Charter, as derived from the peoples, "ultimately assumes that in
the international community, sovereign national authority is itself, in some degree,
constrained by the authority of the people it seeks to symbolize or represent. In short,
the tacit assumption of the authority of sovereignty is actually rooted in the perspectives
of all peoples in the global community who are not objects of sovereignty but subjects of
it.").
79 Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 461.
80 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8, 1996) (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry), at 441 [hereinafter
Legality of Nuclear Weapons].
81 Id.
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peoples to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."8 2
The third refers to the "dignity and worth of the human person.""
The fourth precept is the principle of equal rights of nations. 84 The
fifth key concept refers to the "maintenance of obligations arising
from treaties and 'other sources of international law.""' Finally,
the sixth key precept expressed in the preamble of the Charter is
"its object of promoting social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom."
The key principles of the U.N. Charter expressed in the
preamble are not merely precatory. Chapter I of the U.N. Charter
incorporates the preamble into the purposes of the U.N. Charter,
which include "promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms."" As will be explained more
fully in Part IX, this implies that a state may deny immunity, if
that is necessary to fulfill the principles and purposes, including
the six key precepts, of the U.N. Charter.
Evidence on restrictions of sovereignty apart from the U.N.
Charter may also be found, for example, in the Asylum case.
There the ICJ stressed that customary international law on
diplomatic asylum necessarily required a derogation of state
sovereignty over its own territory.8 9 It should also be recognized
that the transfer of sovereign powers away from the states is
evidenced by the enormous growth of international judicial
tribunals in the last decades, such as the International Criminal
Court and various ad hoc tribunals such as those in Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia.90
82 Id. at 442.
83 Id.
84 Id
85 Id. (emphasis in original).
86 Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 442.
87 U.N. Charter, Ch. I, art. 3.
88 Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20, 1950).
89 Id. at 274-75.
90 See generally, Karen J. Alter, Delegating Sovereignty to International Courts,
(Northwestern University, draft paper), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/cicl/pdf/dsworkshop/alter.pdf (discussing the newly expanded
scope of international courts' delegations: from dispute resolution to administrative,
constitutional review and even enforcement).
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In 1999, then-Secretary General of the U.N., Kofi Annan,
proclaimed, "State sovereignty [is] being redefined by the forces
of globalization and international cooperation." 91 The modern
political and legal system is one significantly dominated by the
nation-state. 9 2  However, the paradigm of state-sovereign
domination in international law is ebbing and providing legal
space for a human rights-based approach. In Judge Cangado
Trindade's separate opinion in the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on
Kosovo, he noted this shift, stating that the world community is
now moving towards "a normative ... people-centered
outlook .. . . Judge Bennouna made this same observation in
his separate opinion in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State,
where he stated, "The Westphalian concept of sovereignty is thus
gradually receding, as the individual takes centre stage in the
international legal system." 94
The nation-state still is an important part of the global legal
landscape. The human species, while capable of incredible
compassion, is still one also capable of unfathomable cruelty.
Man is still too often a wolf to other men. The nation-state serves
to protect individuals, one hopes, more often than to brutalize
them, and sovereign nation-states, in the context of international
relations, may still serve as a vital protector, arbitrator, and
advocate of their people's interests. But the rise of the individual
in international law should be noted and celebrated. Finding the
appropriate balance of powers between states in protecting human
rights and between states and individuals regarding those rights is
why jurisdictional immunity of states is at such a crucial
crossroads today.
91 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 584
(Steiner, Alston eds., 2000), cited in Stacy Humes-Schulz, Note, Limiting Sovereign
Immunity in the Age ofHuman Rights, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 105, 111 (2008).
92 See Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 432.
93 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, separate opinion of Judge
Trindade, 2010 I.C.J. 22, 1 170, (July 2010). Although this case was heard in the context
of statehood, Judge Trindade's insight is just as relevant in the context of jurisdictional
immunity.
94 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening), separate
opinion of Judge Bennouna, 2012 I.C.J. 143 T 3 (Feb. 3).
[Vol. XXXVIII396
RESTRICTIONS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IV. Sovereignty in Context: Competing Doctrines
International law is a system of interlocking principles. It is a
complex web of norms, interests, and, often, contending values.
Although this paper focuses on the international law of
sovereignty in the context of jurisdictional immunity, it is not
possible to isolate it from the co-existing doctrines, inter-alia, of
head of state immunity, universal jurisdiction, and jus cogens
norms. These doctrines build upon and support one another. They
too are expectations creating and influencing the reach of
sovereign immunity. It is therefore necessary to briefly consider
the legal effects on sovereignty of developments in these other
principles of international law.
A. Individual Accountability and Universal Jurisdiction
In the year 43 B.C. Cicero wrote silent enim legs inter arma
("laws are inoperative in war").95 That statement was largely true
into the 1940s for the ultimate decision makers behind state
coercion, even those leading to atrocities. The protection that high
government officials enjoy is known as head-of-state immunity.96
In the mid-twentieth century, head-of-state immunity was
significantly checked, and Cicero's statement lost traction.97 The
genesis of criminal accountability for sovereigns and heads of
state can be traced back to the Nuremberg trials following the
conclusion of the Second World War." In the most famous post-
95 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS Pro Milone 151 (3rd ed. 1980) (44-
43 B.C.).
96 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: IMMUNITY OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS OF OTHER STATES § 464 1 14 (1987)
("Ordinarily, a proceeding against a head of state or government that is in essence a suit
against the state is treated like a claim against the state for purposes of immunity.").
97 See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
98 Following the First World War, there were efforts to criminally try Kaiser
Wilhelm of Germany for war crimes and what would now be called the crime of
aggression. Also, some Turkish military leaders were initially charged with crimes that
closely resemble crimes against humanity. Both of these efforts failed. In the case of the
Kaiser, his criminal indictment was mooted by Holland's granting him amnesty, and in
the case of the Turkish generals, political expediency and hopes that Turkey could serve
as a buffer to an expanding Soviet Russia meant that all political will to see Turkey
undertake serious criminal proceedings ebbed beyond recovery. See generally M. Cherif
Bassiouni, World War 1: "The War to End All Wars" and the Birth of a Handicapped
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war trial, twenty-four Nazi leaders were tried by the allied powers,
and many, including Hermann Gdring, were convicted and
sentenced to death.99 Never before had the political and military
leaders of a defeated enemy been given a criminal proceeding with
legal representation.100
The principle lesson of Nuremberg (and Tokyo) was that when
officials abuse sovereignty, they lose the protections of
sovereignty, and that sovereign omnipotence was limited.'0' This
meant that the defeated states' officials could be tried by courts
created by agreement among the victor states. The recently-
created U.N. endorsed the Nuremberg trials by resolution.102
Nagan and Hammer have pointed out elsewhere:
One of the most important outcomes of World War II was the
general acceptance of the principle that States that act as
aggressors abuse their sovereignty, and their leaders may be
accountable directly to the international community ....
Nuremberg established the principle that State officials could be
tried for criminal offenses under international law .... . o3
In Nuremberg, the court rejected the claim that the defendants
were merely following the orders of the sovereign. The court of
law could therefore penetrate the veil of the state and sovereign to
hold the decision makers to account. In historic terms, Nuremburg
established a critical repudiation of the principle of sovereign
absolutism. It effectively repudiated legal theories of sovereignty
that sought to shield defendants from responsibility for mass
murder.'04
In early 2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted
International Criminal Justice System, 30 DENV. .. INT'L L. & POL'Y 244 (2002).
99 See ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 76 (Caroll & Graf eds., 7th ed.
1993).
100 Id.
101 See Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34, at 504.
102 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the NUrnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946).
103 Winston Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in
International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141, 161-
166 (2004).
104 Id. at 160 (further discussing the erosion of absolute immunity for heads of
state).
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Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, of various
international crimes for acts occurring while he was in office.os
Taylor's conviction reaffirms the lesson of Nuremberg:
sovereignty cannot be used to avoid international criminal
responsibility, and sovereign privileges are waived for individuals
who abuse their sovereign powers. These cases represent a clear
limitation on sovereign omnipotence. The emerging jus cogens
restriction to jurisdictional immunity takes these lessons and
applies them to the state.'
Universal jurisdiction is another contending international law
principle that further develops the idea that sovereignty is
morphed by important values. The Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law notes,
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism, even where [no other] bases of jurisdiction ...
is present.' 07
In the Pinochet case, the U.K. House of Lords dealt with the
applicability of the universality principle to former heads of
state.'0o The case involved Spain's request to extradite former
dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet from Britain for, inter-alia,
torture that occurred in Chile.109  Although Pinochet was
eventually returned to Chile due to medical conditions rendering
him unfit to stand trial, the House of Lords did conclude that
Pinochet could be tried for torture in the United Kingdom.o"0 Lord
105 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Judgment, (Apr. 26,
2012).
106 Of course, unlike individual accountability, civil claims against a state imply
that every individual in the state is responsible, or at least obliged to pay compensation
for the crimes of specific individuals. We feel that this is a price worth paying. When a
state operates beyond its borders, civil claims against the state will serve as insurance in
the event the state is used to violate international law norms, such asjus cogens.
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION TO DEFINE AND PUNISH CERTAIN OFFENSES § 404 (1987).
108 R. v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others ex
parte Pinochet, 119 .L.R. 135 (1999).
109 Id
110 Id.
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Browne-Wilkinson stated:
The jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture
justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture
wherever committed. International law provides that offences
jus cogens may be punished by any state because the offenders
are "common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an
equal interest in their apprehension and prosecution.""
This case demonstrates the important extension of jurisdiction
over former (and possibly current) heads of states for certain
crimes that occurred outside of the forum state. But like the
expansion of exceptions to jurisdictional immunity (discussed
infra), exceptions to head of state immunity have not been
universally accepted or embraced by the ICJ.1 12
In the Pinochet appeal, Lord Browne-Wilkinson linked "the
'jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture' to the
justification of the use of universal jurisdiction on the part of
States."ll This is the paradigmatic example of a state asserting
jurisdiction based on the universality principle for criminal
violations, but there are others.114 Universal jurisdiction allows a
state to hear a civil or criminal case regarding a matter in which it
normally would have no interest. The state is able to hear these
cases under universal jurisdiction because of a case's relevance to
world peace or fundamental values of the international community
as a whole. Although traditionally this doctrine was meant to
apply to piracy, inherently stateless criminal conduct for which no
better forum existed, the doctrine has since expanded to include
most, if not all, jus cogens norms."' The universality principle is
III Id. at 149 (citing Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky 603 F.Supp. 1468; 776 F.2d. 571
(1985)).
112 See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) (finding that immunity for heads of state is customary international
law).
113 BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 597.
114 See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20263 (S.D. Fla., Apr.
28, 2006); Case of the Plan de Sanchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 7,
1/A Court H.R., (Nov. 19, 2007).
115 See William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The
Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law, 41
HARV. INTL'L L.J. 129, 180 (2000).
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important here because it shows that the traditional sovereign
prerogatives, even of prescribing law based on nationality and
territory, have been dramatically altered to account for various
expectations on the nature of sovereignty.1 6 Universal jurisdiction
both expands and limits sovereignty. It expands sovereignty by
allowing states to assert juridical jurisdiction over certain matters,
if the result is to promote global values. On the other hand,
universality detracts from some of the previously exclusive
prescribing functions of the state, particularly when to do so would
be at odds with global values.117 It is also important to further
juxtapose sovereignty with the competing principle ofjus cogens.
B. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes
The era before Nuremberg was a period where natural law was
overshadowed by positivist doctrines. The theories of Austin
prevailed over those of Grotius."' But with Nuremberg, there was
a revival of the notion that there existed a natural body of
fundamental laws derived from providence or inherent in
humanity.'19 Jus cogens norms are at the pinnacle of natural law.
The jus cogens principle is codified in Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.12 0 It defines ajus cogens as "a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character."12 ' The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia explained in
Prosecutor v. Furundzifa that a jus cogens norm is "a norm that
enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law
116 See generally Garland A. Kelley, Does Customary International Law Supersede
a Federal Statute?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507 (1999) (considering the impact of
customary international law on ambiguous or contradictory federal statutes).
117 Id.
118 See generally Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, supra note 34 (describing the
evolution from Grotius's discourse on international law and the problem of multiple
sovereigns to Austin's more centralized sovereignty ideas)
119 See Nagan & Hammer, Communications Theory, supra note 22, at 160.
120 V.C.L.T., supra note 8, art. 53.
121 Id
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and even 'ordinary' customary rules."1 2 2
Jus cogens represent fundamental rights in international law.
As Michael Reisman has described them, jus cogens are "planks
of an international bill of rights" the importance of which "cannot
be overstated."1 23 Jus cogens is such a powerful norm that it even
serves to limit the expansive powers of the Security Council.124
Ian Brownlie has pointed to a case from the European Court of
Justice, holding for the proposition that jus cogens places a limit
upon the otherwise binding effects of Security Council
resolutions.'2 5
While the jus cogens concept was controversial at the time of
the conference which produced the Vienna Convention, the
principle is generally accepted today, though its breadth and
applicability are vigorously contested.12 6  Article 53 does not
contain a list, or even illustrations, of what might constitute jus
cogens; the Vienna Convention leaves that to be determined by
state practice and the jurisprudence of state and international
courts. 12 The criteria used for identifying which international
norms have attained jus cogens status varies and is disputed.'2 8
Brownlie has noted in his treatise that "more authority exists for
the category ofjus cogens than exists for its particular content."l12 9
Perhaps the closest thing to a codification of the existing jus
cogens norms is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), which lists the crimes the Court is competent to hear
122 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 153 (Dec. 10,
1998) (further noting that "[t]he most conspicuous consequence of this higher rank is
that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by States through international
treaties or local or special customs or even general customary rules not endowed with the
same normative force").
123 Reisman, International Law-making, supra note 15, at 109.
124 BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 511.
125 Id
126 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 257-258 (1st ed., 2000);
see also, BROWNLtE, supra note 32, at 512.
127 But see Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 Am. J.
INT'L L. 291, 299-302 (2006) (noting that the 1.L.C. and the V.C.L.T. have references in
their commentaries and discussions of the norms against genocide, slave trading, and the
use of force not in self-defense).
128 BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 512.
129 Id.
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(though it is over-inclusive).o The Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law also provides guidance as to which acts rise to the
level of jus cogens.13 ' States are not obligated to look to the ICC
statute or the Restatement when determining whether an act is a
jus cogens; however, they may draw from the expectations of
emerging international law. This in turn can be strengthened by
supplementation with other sources of international law, including
the opinions of juris consults.132
Genocide, slavery, and a prohibition on the (unjustified) use of
force incorporate legal expectations that are the most widely
accepted jus cogens norms. It is now also generally accepted that
torture constitutes a jus cogens norm (though as the American
water-boarding controversy has shown, there is sharp dispute as to
which acts constitute torture).133  The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has written that "the right to be free from official
torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the
highest status under international law, a norm of jus cogens."'34
This sentiment has been cited favorably by the U.K. House of
Lords and by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
130 Rome Statute of the International Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002) (listing the four umbrella crimes that the Court has
jurisdiction to hear: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression). Articles 6, 7, and 8 give specific examples of the first three crimes. Id. art.
6-8. The Crime of Aggression was not defined until the 2010 amendments to the Rome
Statute were adopted. See id.
131 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 (1987) ("A State violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones (a)
genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.") The Restatement
notes in comment a that this list is not exhaustive. Id. at cmt. A.
132 See e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 239 (2d Cir. 2003).
133 See, e.g., Humes-Schulz, supra note 91, at 111 (pointing out that academics and
jurists generally agree that torture is a jus cogens) (referencing Alan Dershowitz, The
Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REv. 2013, 2024 (2003)
(suggesting that in the ticking time bomb scenario, it would be legal, perhaps even
mandated, to torture a terrorist in order to give over information to prevent certain death,
and because the ban on torture would be curtailed in this situation, it is ipso facto not a
jus cogens)).
134 Siderman De Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Yugoslavia.'3 5 (It should be noted that the U.N. Convention
Against Torture contains provisions obliging states to exercise
universal jurisdiction when torturers are found within their
territory.'36 ) In the celebrated Filartiga case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the Alien Tort Statute'3 7
and held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official
authority violates universally accepted norms of the international
law of human rights."'3 8 As the Filartiga court put it:
In the modem age, humanitarian and practical considerations
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that
respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and
collective interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed by
all nations . . . is the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed,
for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the
pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind. 3 9
When a norm attains the character of jus cogens, an obligation
of erga omnes is imposed upon states as a result.'4 0 The doctrine
of erga omnes-obligations owed by states to the community of
states as a whole-has been affirmed as a principle of international
135 See R v. Bow Street Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1
A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Q.B.); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-
95-17/1-T, Judgment, 153 ("Because of the importance of the values [the prohibition
on torture] protects, this principle has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens.").
136 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment arts. 5-7, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N.T.S. 1465, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html.
137 This case did not rely solely on universal jurisdiction. At issue was the
applicability of the Alien Tort Statute, which was enacted by the first Congress in 1789.
The statute grants federal courts a mix of universal jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction
for certain civil claims. It provides that U.S. district courts have original jurisdiction
over "all cases where an alien sues for a tort only [committed] in violation of the law of
nations." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795). However, other aspects of American doctrine
of procedure and process require, for example, the individual jurisdiction that is to be
asserted to be served with process or located in U.S. territory. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, §(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
138 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
139 Id. at 890.
140 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, TT 260-62; see also
BROWNUE, supra note 32, at 597.
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law by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case.14 1 In Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Genocide Case), the ICJ articulated an
erga omnes duty relating to genocide.142  The court found that
every state has a duty to prevent and to punish the crime of
genocide, wherever that crime may occur. The court noted "the
universal character both of the condemnation of genocide and of
the co-operation required 'in order to liberate mankind from such
an odious scourge.""" Erga omnes further ties the principle of
universal jurisdiction and jus cogens together. These doctrines,
especially jus cogens and erga omnes, generate legal expectations
that modify the concept of sovereignty and form a powerful
substantive framework for analyzing the appropriateness of
waiving (or granting) jurisdictional immunity to states.
Finally, it should also be briefly noted that the Act of State
doctrine serves in a supplemental capacity to sovereign
immunity.144 Simply, the Act of State doctrine provides that one
state will not pass judgment upon the lawfulness of the acts of
another state taken within their territory if it does not violate
international law.'45 Like jurisdictional immunity, exceptions exist
to the Act of State doctrine and are expanding, showing that
sovereign prerogatives are weakened in the face of competing
expectations which incorporate superior values.
V. The Historical Development of Jurisdictional Immunity
The doctrine of jurisdictional immunity takes the abstract
concept of sovereignty and applies it to facts on the ground. As
the Restatement notes, "[u]nder international law, a state or state
141 See Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belg.
v Spain) 1970 I.C.J. Rep 44, T 33 (Feb. 5).
142 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 595 131 (July 11).
143 Id.
144 Myres S. McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Some
Suggested Amendments, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1981 4, 4 (Martha L. Landwehr ed., 1981) [hereinafter
McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act].
145 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(articulating the Act of State Doctrine); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
another state ... ." The Restatement further states
unambiguously that the rule of sovereign immunity is "an
undisputed principle of customary international law." 47 1In order
to fully appreciate the limits and exceptions to the rule articulated
in the Restatement, the historical development of the jurisdictional
immunity doctrine itself must first be closely scrutinized.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is one of the older
concepts in customary international law.14 8  Immunity from the
jurisdiction of another state's courts is conceptually related to the
idea of the monarch as sovereign over its territory and people. In
medieval Europe, kings were theoretically equal and immune from
the courts of another when traveling abroad.149 Since the Treaty of
Westphalia, the basic principle of jurisdictional immunity has been
largely uncontroversial."' As has been stated elsewhere,
The Treaty of Westphalia, in effect, recognized that a European
body politic would be a decentralized sovereignty-dominated
body politic. This meant that the local elites (i.e. dukes, princes,
146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATE FROM JURISDICTION To ADJUDICATE: THE BASIC RULE § 451
(1987).
147 Id
148 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 102(2) (1987) (explaining that "[c]ustomary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation"). Customary international law is evidenced by
state practice, supported by opinio juris, as well as what other interest groups are
communicating about their understanding of international law. In the absence of
domestic statutes to the contrary, persistent objection, or treaty agreements, states are
obligated to adhere to customary international law. See also Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
149 In fact, a legal fiction was developed to treat sovereigns as not actually being
physically present in the foreign state while visiting it. See Schooner Exch. v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 132 (1812) (discussing arguments by U.S. Attorney
General Pinkney in favor of dismissing the case on the basis of France's sovereign
immunity, including that "the rights of a foreign sovereign cannot be submitted to a
judicial tribunal. He is supposed to be out of the country, although he may happen to be
within it").
150 See Benjamin Straumann, The Peace of Westphalia (1648) as a Secular
Constitution, at * 13, Constellations, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 2008, INST. FOR INT'L L. AND J.
Working Paper No. 2007/07, available at
http://www.iilj.org/aboutus/documents/Straumann.Westphalia.pdf.
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kings) would now exercise secular sovereign authority over the
lands and territories over which they could claim authority and
control.is5
But if sovereigns were to be effectively in control, their
authority must not be abrogable. Certainly it could not be waived
by the courts of another sovereign.'5 2
A. The Absolute Theory
The absolute theory of jurisdictional immunity was famously
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon.'53  In the early nineteenth century,
American plaintiffs sought to lay claim to a ship which was seized
at a U.S. port. 5 4  The ship belonged to the plaintiffs, but the
French Navy, under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte, had
seized and commandeered it on the high seas."' Justice Marshall,
writing for a unanimous Court, held that the French government
was entitled to immunity and therefore should retain the vessel.'
Marshall reasoned that, although the United States had the power
to assert judicial jurisdiction over its own territory and over the
property and people within it (the territorial principle),'5 7  that
power could be nullified by the jurisdictional immunity of a
foreign sovereign:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the
attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring
extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign
sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One
151 See Nagan & Haddad, Sovereignty, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, supra
note 34, at 446.
152 Id. at 442 (explaining that in medieval Europe it was understood that "[i]n order
to discharge the obligation [of a sovereign] to protect, the sovereign needs effective
government. To have effective government, its authority must be absolute. It is
essential for sovereignty to have certain rights that cannot be tested").
153 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116(1812).
154 Id at 117.
155 Id
156 Id.
157 In addition to the universality basis of jurisdiction, international law recognizes
four other bases: the objective territorial principle, the protective principle, the
nationality principle, and the passive personality principle. See United States v. Usama
Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the
dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a
foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent
sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved
by implication, and will be extended to him.
This perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual
intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other,
have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is
understood to wave the exercise of a part of that complete
exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the
attribute of every nation.
There were no exceptions to the rule of immunity articulated
by Marshall, hence the rule was absolute. It may be that Justice
Marshall, who had been Secretary of State"' and was therefore
familiar with interstate practices, understood that the recognition
of sovereign immunity for foreign states was also a confident
assertion of American sovereignty-at a time when the security of
the United States was still precarious."'
There were practical as well as theoretical groundings for the
rule of immunity. Comity and reciprocal treatment meant
sovereigns were hesitant to assert jurisdiction over other
sovereigns.'6 1 As sovereign kings gave way to the sovereign
nation-state, sovereign immunity was transferred to the new body
politic, and considerations of foreign policy and domestic
protection justified applying the rule of immunity to the nation-
state.162 Indeed, as McDougal noted in his compelling critique of
158 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137 (1812).
159 See generally, JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION
(1996) (discussing, in part, Justice Marshall's influence as Secretary of State, before his
term as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court).
160 Id. (detailing the instability of the relatively new nation).
161 See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 220-21 (1951) [hereinafter Lauterpacht, The Problem
of Jurisdictional Immunities].
162 Id.
408 [Vol. XXXVIII
RESTRICTIONS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
jurisdictional immunity, "A world largely organized by the
institutions of the nation-state could scarcely aspire toward even
minimum order in the absence of such reciprocal honoring and
protection." 6 3 Asserting jurisdiction over another state could have
a major impact on states' foreign relations. 6 4 In the 1849 decision
Spanish Government v. Lambege et Pujol, the Supreme Court of
France explained that:
The reciprocal independence of states is one of the most
universally respected principles of international law, and it
follows as a result therefrom that a government cannot be
subjected to the jurisdiction of another against its will, and that
the right of jurisdiction of one government over litigation arising
from its own acts is a right inherent to its sovereignty that
another government cannot seize without impairing their mutual
relations.165
A British court echoed this sentiment in The Parlement Belge
case decided in 1880, where it said,
As a consequence of the absolute independence of every
sovereign authority, and of the international comity which
induces every sovereign state to respect the independence and
dignity of every other sovereign state, each and every one
declines to exercise by means of its courts any of its territorial
jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign . . ..166
These cases reflect the traditional notion of absolute
jurisdictional independence and state sovereignty.167 But evenin
Marshall's time, the absolute theory was not universally
accepted.168 Additionally, as the world became more integrated,
absolute immunity increasingly seemed archaic without
163 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 3.
164 See generally, Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1
(1991).
165 JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, POLICY RESEARCH STUDY 20 (1963) (quoting Government of
Spain v. Lambege et Pujol, Casaux, France. Court of Cassation, January 22, 1849, Sirey
(1849), I, 81).
166 Id. (quoting The Parlement Belge, 5 P.O. 197, 217 (1879)).
167 See Finke, supra note 3, at 858-60 (describing the difference between absolute
and restrictive immunity).
168 Id. at 858.
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qualification. McDougal noted, "The notion of an absolute
sovereign immunity is recognized to hark back to a time when
personal sovereigns were indeed above the law within their own
States, and a rational conception of State immunity is seen to have
no deeper roots than the reciprocal interests of States in preventing
interference with each other's basic governmental activities."1 69
B. Changing Expectations: The Restrictive Theory
Judicially, there was an important nineteenth century effort to
provide a restriction on the absolute nature of sovereign immunity.
The Charkieh case of 1873 involved a vessel owned by the
Khedive of Egypt that was being used as a merchant trading
vessel.' This trading vessel was involved in a collision in
England, on the River Thames. Sir Robert Phillimore, the High
Court of Admiralty judge hearing the case, presented the problem
of the necessity of a restricted view of sovereign immunity as
follows:
No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no
dictum of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to
authorize a sovereign prince to assume the character of a trader,
when it is for his benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a
private subject to throw off, if I may so speak, his disguise, and
appear as a sovereign, claiming for his own benefit, and to the
injury of a private person, for the first time, all the attributes of
his character . . .. Assuming the privilege to exist, it has been
waived with reference to this ship by the conduct of the person
who claims it."' 7 1
Phillimore recognized that under color of sovereignty there
may be a multitude of activities, not all of which should be
covered by the mantle of sovereign immunity. This of course
generated an analysis of: the kind of activity, the participants in
that activity, and whether the activity had the essential character of
the public orientation of sovereign competence. This analysis did
not solve all the problems of sovereign functions that fell inside or
169 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 11.
170 The Charkieh, 4 ADMR. & Ecc. 59, 59 (1873), available at
http://unisetca.ipower.com/other/cs2/LR4AE59.html.
171 Id. at 99-100.
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outside the reach of sovereign immunity, but it posed questions
requiring more careful consideration before conclusions could be
reached about whether immunity was appropriate. One should
keep in mind that Phillimore's concerns did not necessarily
dispose of the essential strength of the principle articulated in
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, par in parem jurisdictionem
non habet, but only placed it in a context of actual interactions
between states.
Increasing commercial interaction between states, such as that
which occurred in Charkieh, changed the fundamental nature of
jurisdictional immunity of states and led to the first categorical
exception to the rule: the commercial exception. The emergence
of the commercial exception to sovereign immunity was a product
of globalization and an increase in cross-border movements of
goods, services, communication, people, and capital. The
essential question courts posed was whether the acts of a state in
question were the traditional public acts of sovereigns or those
private acts generally performed by individuals alone.'7 2 In 1903,
the Supreme Court of Belgium gave an early explanation of the
distinction between public and commercial acts in the case,
Societe Anonyme des Chemins de Fer Liegeois Luxembourgeois v.
the Netherlands:
Sovereignty is involved only when political acts are
accomplished by the state .... However, the state is not bound
to confine itself to a political role, and can, for the needs of the
collectivity, buy, own, contract, become creditor or debtor, and
engage in commerce . . . . In the discharge of these functions, the
state is not acting as public power, but does what private persons
do, and as such, is acting in a civil and private capacity. When
after bargaining on a footing of equality with a person or
incurring a responsibility in no way connected with the political
order, the state is drawn in litigation, the litigation concerns a
civil right, within the sole jurisdiction of the courts ... and the
foreign state as civil person is like any other foreign person
amendable to the Belgian courts.173
172 See, e.g., SWEENEY, supra note 165, at 20-21 (noting the ability of a state to act
outside of its political role in a private capacity).
173 Id. at 20-21 (quoting Societe Anonyme des Chemins de Fer Liegeois
Luxembourgeois v. Netherlands, Pas. 1, 294, 301 (1903)).
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In fact, the Brussels Convention of 1926 was an early treaty
restricting sovereign immunity.'7 4 It required state-owned vessels
operating for commercial purposes to subject themselves to local
jurisdiction as if they were owned by private individuals."' Thus,
early experience indicated that when states engage in ordinary
transactions they are really no different than ordinary private
actors. As a consequence, normal law is appropriate to adjudicate
rights and obligations. These experiences, however, do represent
the emergence of changed expectations about the reach of the rule
of law between public actors and private citizens.
Some states, like the United States, were much slower to
recognize the commerce exception to immunity. It was not until
the Cold War that the United States finally embraced the
exception.'7 6  In addition to increased interstate trade, the
acceptance of the commercial exception was hastened by the
communist practice of attributing all commercial activity to the
state. 7 7  In practice, states in the socialist bloc of nations
monopolized the economic orderings Within their states and were
involved in trading relations with private sector actors in the
capitalist world.77 But, because the state owned the means of
production, these relationships implied a vastly expanded meaning
of sovereign competence. For example, a state might invoke
sovereign immunity if it decided not to perform on an ordinary
contractual obligation. Since these public actors were effectively
behaving like private sector entrepreneurs, the problem became
whether a state could use the theory of sovereign immunity to
shield itself from domestic courts of a foreign state for
174 Id. at 49 (quoting 1926 International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules concerning the Immunity of State-owned Vessels, Hudson, Int. Legis., iii, no. 154,
Art. II.).
175 See BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 329.
176 See SWEENEY, supra note 166, at 21-22. But see Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562 (1926) (examining absolute rule of immunity, when it came under attack by a
lower court in the 1920s).
'77 Id.
178 See generally, Jack Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign
Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952), reprinted in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976) [hereinafter
Tate Letter].
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consequences arising out of ordinary commercial activities.
Writing during the Cold War, McDougal noted:
The increasing entry of States into economic and other activities,
not indispensable to government, and still performed in many
States by private parties, along with continued insistence upon
State immunity, has introduced an element of lawlessness into
transactional activities and, hence, of arbitrariness and
unfairness to private parties in deprivation both of their
reasonable expectations and of recourse to law for the protection
of such expectations. 7 9
Attempts were made to articulate policy reasons for a more
limited form of jurisdictional immunity. In U.S. practice it
became appropriate to do so through an instrument known as "the
Tate Letter," which was brought to the attention of the courts.180
The U.S. change in policy was explained in the letter of 1952,
where the Acting Legal Advisor for the State Department sent a
memorandum to the Attorney General explaining the
Department's desire to restrict immunity to traditional acts of
states-what is generally called the restrictive theory of
jurisdictional immunity.'"' The Tate Letter states:
The Department of State has for some time had under
consideration the question whether the practice of the
Government in granting immunity from suit to foreign
governments made parties defendant in the courts of the United
States without their consent should not be changed. The
Department has now reached the conclusion that such immunity
should no longer be granted in certain types of cases .... The
reasons which obviously motivate state trading countries in
adhering to the theory with perhaps increasing rigidity are most
persuasive that the United States should change its policy.
Furthermore, the granting of sovereign immunity to foreign
governments in the courts of the United States is most
inconsistent with the action of the Government of the United
States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both
contract and tort and with its long established policy of not
claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions for its merchant
179 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 11.
180 Tate Letter, supra note 178.
181 Id.
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vessels. Finally, the Department feels that the widespread and
increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in
commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will
enable persons doing business with them to have their rights
determined in the courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be
the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign
governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.2
The restrictive theory is a bifurcation of immunity between
commercial and non-commercial activities, as was expressed in
the Tate Letter. It is also known as the actajure imperii-actajure
gestionis distinction."' Under the traditional restrictive theory,
when states engaged in official, sovereign activities (acta jure
imperii) they were afforded immunity; when states engaged in
activities of a private nature (acta jure gestionis), such as with
commercial activities, they were denied immunity.'
The Tate Letter neither is nor was international law by itself.
However, it endorsed a trend in legal expectations in the form of
evidence brought to the attention of the court as to whether the
executive branch believes, as a political matter, that the immunity
of a state should be honored in the courts."' The Tate Letter
created expectations about the restrictive reach of sovereign
immunity. It was a clear communication about what the United
States understood to be the developing state of an international law
doctrine. Following the Tate Letter, neither party to litigation in
U.S. courts could assume that immunity was absolute and,
therefore, each party had to expect that the Tate Letter might
generate restrictive expectations about the reach of sovereign
immunity.18 6 Further, they had to assume that U.S. practice in
182 Id. American courts were not obliged to follow the recommendations of the
State Department; however, the judiciary generally defers to the executive in matters of
international relations. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 712-13
(embracing the restrictive theory of immunity).
183 See generally, Sienho Yee, Foreign Sovereign Immunities, Acta Jure Imperii
and Acta Jure Gestionis: A Recent Exposition from the Canadian Supreme Court, 2
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 649 (2003) (demonstrating the importance of the distinction between
acts of government and acts of commercial entities).
184 See Humes-Schulz, supra note 91, at 109.
185 Tate Letter, supra note 178.
186 Alfred Dunhill ofLondon, Inc., 425 U.S. at 711.
414 [Vol. XXXVIII
RESTRICTIONS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
using the letter would, in general, aspire to be consistent.
Unfortunately, while the Tate Letter articulated the policy reasons
for replacing the absolute theory with the restrictive theory of
jurisdictional immunity, it offered little indication as to how
restrictive immunity was to be applied.'87 McDougal noted, for
example, that the Tate Letter "offered no criteria or procedures for
distinguishing public acts from private acts, gave no instructions
as to whether the courts or the Department of State was to make
such determinations, [and] failed to set forth a viable procedure for
serving a foreign State or instrumentality."' 8 Nevertheless, the
Tate letter was highly influential in U.S. practice before the
courts,18 9 and states began to recognize the commercial exception
adopted by the United States. The restrictive rule of sovereign
immunity, based on the acta jure imperii-acta jure gestionis
distinction, gained traction in the world community. 90
At the very minimum, the Tate Letter established a breach in
the doctrine of jurisdictional immunity. Although incomplete, the
Tate Letter also reflected an aspect of international law-making.9
The letter established the element of a prescriptive content that
permitted the limitation on sovereign immunity, which was
honored by the judiciary. Additionally, the letter was a strong
communication from an important nation-state indicating
acceptance of the idea of a limitation on sovereign immunity,
187 Tate Letter, supra note 178.
188 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 9.
189 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 682 (discussing four justices'
support for the restrictive theory of immunity endorsed by the Tate Letter).
190 Germany, for example, took this position in 1963. See 16 ENTSHEIDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 27, translated in 45 I.L.R. 57; the United Kingdom did
not make the departure until 1977, in the case of Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 2 W.L.R. 356 (1977); the remaining communist states still adhere to an
absolute theory of immunity. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATE FROM JURISDICTION TO
ADJUDICATE: THE BASIC RULE § 451 (1987) ("Communist states, which carry on
substantial commercial activity through state trading companies, have often claimed
absolute sovereign immunity with respect to their own activities. The Soviet Union has
regarded the restrictive view of sovereign immunity as a 'device invented by bourgeois
states for the specific purpose of wrecking the monopoly over foreign trade of the
U.S.S.R. and subjecting the Soviet economy to the economies of the capitalist states."');
see also Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
191 Tate Letter, supra note 178.
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under certain circumstances, in its domestic courts. In short, the
Tate Letter initiated a weak form of international expectation
creation with regard to the prescriptive content of limits on
jurisdictional immunity. The Tate Letter contributed to the
emergence of a rule of international custom broadening the scope
and character of restrictions on sovereign immunity.
As the Tate Letter noted, states' refusal to grant immunity to
other states for commercial activities was consistent with domestic
policy voluntarily waiving a state's own immunity for certain
acts.19 2 The U.S. legislature did this via the Federal Tort Claims
Act."' Following the Tate Letter, the decision of whether to grant
a foreign state immunity was largely an executive decision. The
State Department advised the courts on a case-by-case basis
whether immunity should be granted.'94 In practice, it was often
difficult for the executive to determine, on the basis of principled
objectivity, whether a given activity was actajure gestionis or not
due to the political considerations weighing upon the branch.'9 5
This produced inconsistent treatment of states in similar
circumstances.19 6  As McDougal noted, this "culminated in an
almost complete subservience by the courts to the executive,
permitting a high degree of politicization of particular
192 See id Immunity is a defense that must be raised by the state contesting
jurisdiction. States are always free to refrain from raising the objection. See Finke, supra
note 3, at 864 ("The very foundation of sovereign immunity-the sovereignty of the
foreign state-obviously allows a state to waive its immunity.").
193 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (waiving immunity for the
state in suits "for ... personal injury... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any [U.S. Government] employee while acting within the scope of his office
or employment"); see also, Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982).
194 See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1169 (citing the history of the U.S. application of
immunity in Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir.
1986)).
195 Several approaches to determine whether or not an act was commercial were put
forward. One analytical approach was to determine the purpose of the government's
acts, while another was to examine the nature of the acts. In practice, an ad hoc
approach was taken, and the executive struggled with consistency. See e.g., Victory
Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
196 See e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976) (leaving room for inconsistent results with its affirmation that sovereign
immunity is not absolute).
416 [Vol. XXXVIII
RESTRICTIONS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
decisions.""' To remedy the ambiguities and inconsistencies of
the Tate Letter system, Congress reacted and passed the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), codifying the
restrictive theory of immunity and putting the power of
determining when to grant immunity to foreign states squarely into
the hands of the judiciary.' The act cleared up many
uncertainties, but the basic structure of the act can be
perplexing.' 99
The emergence of the acta jure imperii-acta jure gestionis
doctrine was the first waiver of absolute jurisdictional immunity to
crystallize into customary international law. It cracked the edifice
of immunity and demonstrated that other important international
and national interests, such as fairness, could trump jurisdictional
immunity. Other exceptions have emerged,20 0 and the question
becomes whether jus cogens violations constitute another type of
exception.
VI. Domestic Statutes Governing Jurisdictional Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a product of treaty law, customary
international law, and domestic law. Section 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice lists "the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations" as a source of international
law.20 ' This has been understood to include municipal laws,202 so
197 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 7.
198 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604; see also
Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidan Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The
'commercial activity' exception of the FSIA withdraws immunity in cases involving
essentially private commercial activities of foreign sovereigns that have an impact within
the United States. This reflects the 'restrictive' theory of sovereign immunity that
underlies the FSIA."); Finke, supra note 3, at 859 (noting that even today,
internationally, "the distinction between private and public acts is applied so divergently
that it is hard to concede more than a very abstract conformity in state practice").
199 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 13-14
(describing the act as "a maze, or pinball machine, constituted by a complex of
interrelated but ambiguous and highly technical concepts and formulations").
200 See generally, infra Part VI.A (discussing the tort exception to sovereign
immunity).
201 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 33 U.N.T.S.
993.
202 See SHAw, supra note 7, at 92-99.
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these domestic statutes also feed into the discussion of the nature
of jurisdictional immunity in international law. In short, they are
creating expectations not only for the nation-state, but also for the
international community.
A. The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In the United States, the FSIA is the primary statute governing
the determination of whether an American court will afford a
foreign state immunity.203 The FSIA contains a commercial
exception.20 4 In testimony before the House of Representatives,
the Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department argued that when
"a foreign state enters the marketplace or when it acts as a private
party, there is no justification in modern international law for
allowing the foreign state to avoid the economic costs of the
agreements which it may breach or the accidents which it may
cause." 205 This principle was applied to non-commercial activities
in the FSIA as well, further elasticizing jurisdictional immunity.206
For purposes of this article, the most important exceptions are
those of tort and waiver, found in FSIA § 1605(a)(5) and
§1605(a)(1) respectively. The tort provision explains that
immunity will be denied when
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death . .. occurring in the United States and caused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official
or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope
203 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604; Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004)
(noting that the FSIA applies retroactively); Seanna Balfe, International Law-
Retroactive Application of Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Allows Claims for Pre-
Enactment Conduct-Austria v. Altmann, 124 S.Ct. 2240 (2004), 28 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 359, 359-60 (2005).
204 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
205 Hearings on H.R. 11315 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 26-
27 (1976) (testimony of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Dep't of State on the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) [hereinafter Legal Adviser Testimony].
206 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (finding and exception where a state explicitly or
implicitly waives its immunity); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (excepting property disputes);
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (excepting disputes of immovable property in the United States);
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (excepting certain torts, discussed infra); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)
(excepting arbitration proceedings)).
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of his office or employment. [emphasis added]207
As one writer noted, the tort exception essentially obliterates
the acta jure imperii-acta jure gestionis distinction.208
"Discretionary" functions of States are not subject to the tort
exception.20 However, U.S. courts have found that assassinations
directed by foreign governments inside the United States are not
discretionary state actions, because assassination is never a
legitimate state activity.210  At first glance, § 1605(a)(5) seems to
cover human rights violations. 211 Genocide, slavery, and the other
jus cogens norms are never legitimate actions for a state to engage
in, so could these activities also fall under the tort exception?2 12
The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the FSIA tort exception
narrowly in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, finding that
"Congress' primary purpose in enacting § 1605(a)(5) was to
eliminate a foreign State's immunity for traffic accidents. ... 213
The narrow construction of FSIA's tort exception is
repudiation of one of the most important interpretive principles of
207 Id. at § 1605(a)(5).
208 See Sergio Saba, Personal Injuries and Damage to Property, in STATE PRACTICE
REGARDING STATE IMMUNITIES 99 (Hafner, Kohen, & Breau eds., 2006).
209 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (explaining immunity is not waived for "any claim based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function regardless of whether the discretion be abused").
210 See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980); see
also, Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (explaining
assassination offended immunity because it was "clearly contrary to the precepts of
humanity as recognized in both national and international law").
211 Even if there was little risk of foreign states committing human rights abuses in
the United States, this is still an important exception, because it bolsters efforts to show
that state practice recognizes a tort exception to jurisdictional immunity. U.S. forces are,
of course, able to commit human rights abuses in the United States.
212 See Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and International Public Order,
45 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 227, 236 (2002) (arguing that international crimes must be
considered as acts which fall outside the legitimate purview of the state).
213 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428, 439-40 (1989). In fact, the
year before this case was heard, a Georgian diplomat hit and killed a 17-year-old girl in
Washington, D.C., while speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol. See
Steven Lee Myers, Envoy Named in Fatal Crash Surrenders to Police, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 1997, at A23; see also Kevin M. Gray, Envoy is Sentenced to Prison in Fatal Crash,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1997, at A10. Following negotiations between the United States
and the Republic of Georgia, Georgia waived immunity for the diplomat, and he was
tried and sentenced to prison. Myers, supra; Gray, supra.
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international law in the domestic courts of the United States. In
The Charming Betsy, Justice Marshall established the basic canon
of interpretation that has been followed by generations of
American lawyers: 2 14  when a court is confronted with two
possible interpretations of an American statute, one which may
transgress international law and one which affirms the rule of
international law, the court must choose the rule or law that
affirms or strengthens the international law prescription.215 Belief
that the tort exception should be confined to a few traffic accident
cases is incompatible with the idea that a legal wrong creates
justifiable expectations of a legal remedy. Furthermore, without
compelling circumstances, the doors of legal justice should not be
barred to litigants with legal expectations that ordinary rights and
duties shall be secured by law. Indeed, it is astonishing that
ordinary rights and duties in the context of contractual law receive
the protections of ordinary justice, but the victims of wrongs of a
tortious nature are largely excluded by this construction of the
statute. Although the tort exception was construed narrowly by
the Supreme Court,2 16 the existence of a tort exception itself is a
further communication by a dominant power that immunity will be
waived for certain activities-even for activities that have nothing
to do with commercial activity.
The waiver exception of the FSIA is uncontroversial in the
sense that states can always voluntarily waive immunity.2 17
However, the implicit waiver is controversial and therefore fertile
ground for dispute. The FSIA contains a waiver exception, which
provides that a state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
the United States when that state "has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication."2 18 A state may implicitly waive its
immunity by treaty, diplomatic communication, or submission to
the proceedings of a state court;219 however, "a waiver of
214 Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6. U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
215 Id.; see generally Frederick Leiner, The Charming Betsy and the Marshal
Court, 45 AM. J. LEGALHIST. 1,1(2001).
216 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 439-40.
217 See Finke, supra note 3, at 864 (discussing the ability of a state to waive its own
immunity).
218 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
219 See BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 340.
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immunity is not necessarily a consent to jurisdiction . . . . [A] base
of jurisdiction must be separately established . . In an often
cited case, Ipitrade International v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that Nigeria had implicitly consented
to waive its immunity when it entered into a contract for cement
containing an arbitration clause, because otherwise the arbitration
clause would have had no effect.221 Implicit waiver is not
embraced in most other states, but the signal from the United
States is strong. Some legal writers have argued that the implicit
waiver exception in the FSIA should apply to jus cogens
violations.2 2  The implicit waiver idea further communicates a
strong authority signal about the limits of sovereign immunity.
More controversial than implicit waiver is the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which amended the
FSIA to allow individuals to sue state "sponsors" of terrorism in
U.S. courts, if those states are certified as such by the U.S.
Government. 2 23  The acts covered include "torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources ... [used] by an official, employee,
or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his
or her office, employment, or agency." 224 This legislation expands
the range of compensable wrongs which may be litigated in the
domestic courts of the United States. In this context, Congress has
delivered a clear repudiation of the narrow and grudging
construction of the tort exception in Amerada Hess.2 5  These
additional changes wed the principles of universality and jus
cogens, albeit with procedural constraints and for a certain class of
220 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 29.
221 Ipitrade Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824, 826-27 (D.D.C.
1978).
222 See Belsky et al., supra note 42, at 394-96. But see Christian Tomuschat, The
International Law of State Immunity and Its Development by National Institutions, 44
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1105, 1123 (2011) (disagreeing with Belsky, and arguing that
"[w]aiver is a deliberate manifestation of will to accept specific legal consequences").
Professor Tomuschat was a co-agent for the Federal Republic of Germany in
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, before the ICJ. Id
223 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605,
1610 (2006).
224 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2006).
225 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
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wrongs.
B. Other Countries' Sovereign Immunities Acts
The United Kingdom,2 26 South Africa,2 27 Australia,22 8
Singapore, 2 29  Argentina, 230  Israel, 23 1 Japan,23 2 Pakistan, 233  and
Canada2 34 have passed similar legislation to the FSIA.235 Like the
United States, the United Kingdom, in the State Immunity Act
(SIA), contains a tort exception.23 6 However, the SIA explicitly
provides that acts (or omissions) of armed forces do not fall within
the scope of the tort exception. 237 The SIA also contains a waiver
provision, but U.K. courts require, as Brownlie noted, "a genuine
and unequivocal submission in the fact of the court: waiver was
not constituted either by a prior contract to submit to the
jurisdiction or by an arbitration clause in a contract,"238 as was the
outcome in the Nigeria cement case.23 9 The SIA was enacted in
226 See State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33 (Eng.).
227 See Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of 1981 (S. Afr.).
228 See Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 as amended (Cth) (Austl.).
229 See Singapore State Immunity Act, (Chapter 313).
230 See Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States in the Argentine Courts, Law No.
(24.488) 1995 (Arg.) (codifying the restrictive approach).
231 See Foreign State Immunity Law, 5769-2008 (Isr.).
232 See Act on the Civil Jurisdiction of Japan with Respect to a Foreign State, Law
No. 24 of 2009 (Japan).
233 See Pakistan State Immunity Ordinance, 1981, reprinted in ERNEST BANKAS,
THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRIVATE SUITs AGAINST
SOVEREIGN STATES IN DOMESTIC COURTS 449 (2005).
234 See State Immunity Act 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 798 (1982).
235 See Finke, supra note 3, at 858 ("States that for whatever reason have forgone
the opportunity to pass national legislation rely on international custom to determine the
scope of immunity which foreign states might claim. In doing so, most states-or, to be
more precise, their courts-assume that sovereign immunity serves as the basic rule until
the existence of an exception has been proven.").
236 State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33 (Eng.) ("A State is not immune as respects
proceedings in respect of-(a) death or personal injury; or (b) damage to or loss of
tangible property, caused by an act or omission in the United Kingdom.").
237 Id. § 16(2) ("This Part of this Act does not apply to proceedings relating to
anything done by or in relation to the armed forces of a State while present in the United
Kingdom and, in particular, has effect subject to the Visiting Forces Act 1952.").
238 BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 340.
239 Ipitrade Int'l v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978).
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order to conform U.K. law with the European Convention on State
Immunity. 240 Like the FSIA, the SIA begins with the assumption
that immunity applies and then lists a series of exceptions.2 4' This
is consistent with most statutes' application of immunity, but as
will be discussed in Part X, this may be the wrong way to
conceptually approach the immunity question.
The FSIA and SIA may appear to be jurisdictional statutes
from U.S. and U.K. perspectives, but from the defending states'
perspective, these domestic statutes alter the substantive nature of
sovereignty. As one writer has pointed out, "the forum state, not
the foreign state defendant, enjoys ultimate authority, by operation
of its domestic legal system, to modify a foreign state's privileges
of immunity." 24 2  Lord Millet, however, described jurisdictional
immunity as flowing from the very concept of sovereignty itself.243
In any case, these statutes, particularly the existence of tort and
waiver exceptions, serve as further evidence that states are
communicating an expectation about immunity that is restricted in
the interest of fairness and justice.
VII. Conventions on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
The first attempt to create an international convention
governing sovereign immunity was in the late nineteenth
244century. In recent decades, several treaty documents have
emerged that attempt to codify the standards of application of
240 BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 337.
241 See State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33 (Eng.).
242 Caplan, supra note 2, at 744.
243 See generally Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1573 (rooting the
immunity determination in sovereign nature of activity). We are uncertain what Lord
Millet means by "the sovereignty of the United Kingdom itself"; it is unclear whether his
Lordship has noted the change in the concept of sovereignty in modern international law.
See id. Under modern international law sovereignty is rooted in the perspectives of the
people themselves. See supra Part III.A. Moreover, human rights and humanitarian
values have been developed specifically to protect "We the peoples." U.N. Charter
Preamble. Thus, the assertion by a stakeholder in the sovereignty of a nation that its
sovereignty be used to protect that stakeholders' expectations in the protections of
humanitarianism and fundamental human rights represent the most important integration
of human rights, humanitarianism, and sovereignty under the U.N. Charter.
244 See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 32nd sess, May 5-July 25, 1980, U.N. Doc.
A/35/10 [hereinafter I.L.C. Rep., 32nd sess]
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245immunity between states. Other conventions are in the drafting
phase.246 All have met with a lukewarm reception and often
confuse emerging issues more often than they clarify or offer
guidance on them.247 Moreover, the drafting process has been
dominated by state representatives who possibly see themselves in
a position adverse to the imposition of sovereign responsibility
and accountability under international law.24 8
A. The UN. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States
In 2004, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the U.N.
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their
Property (U.N. Convention).2 49  The U.N. Convention seeks to
harmonize states' treatment of immunity. It is not yet in force
because it has not yet been adopted by the requisite number of
states to bring the Convention into effect.25 0 Though it has only
been ratified by a handful of states,2 51 it purports to express
already existing customary rules of international law.252 (This
endorses the view that emerging custom is law supported by
authority and controlling efficacy.) This would bind states that are
not parties to the U.N. Convention, at least to some of its
provisions.25 3  The U.N. Convention is a product of twenty-seven
245 See Finke, supra note 3, at 857.
246 Id.
247 See generally id at 871 (explaining practice by States has continually been
inconsistent even up to 2009).
248 See generally I.L.C. Rep., 32nd sess, supra note 244 (explaining that state
representatives believe necessity may require a state to violate international obligations
in some instances).
249 United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, Annex, U.N.Doc.A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter,
U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4280737b4.html (convention not yet in force).
250 Id. art. 30(2) (requiring thirty states to ratify the convention before its entry into
force).
251 See U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property,
New York, USA, Dec. 2, 2004, U.N. Doc A/59/508, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/mtdsg/volume%20i/chapter%20iii/iii-13.en.pdf.
252 U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 249, Preamble.
253 See I.L.C. Rep., 32nd sess, supra note 244 (stating "the preceding review of
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years of labor by the respected International Law Commission
(ILC) .254 The Convention's preamble provides that "the
jurisdictional immunities of States and their property are generally
accepted as a principle of customary international law."25 5 It may
be true that all states recognize jurisdictional immunity, but they
do so only abstractly: there is "substantial disagreement on detail
and substance." 256  Article 5 of the U.N. Convention begins by
providing, "A State enjoys immunity, in respect to itself and its
property, from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State
subject to the provisions of the present Convention." 2 57  The U.N.
Convention then provides a number of exceptions to jurisdictional
immunity,258 Most of which, like the commercial activities
historical and legal developments of the rule of State immunity appears to furnish ample
proof of the foundations of the rule as a general norm of contemporary international
law").
254 In 1977, the U.N. General Assembly recommended to the I.L.C. that it take up
the study of jurisdictional immunity of states and their property with the aim of drafting
a convention developing and codifying that law. See G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004); see also, YbILC 1991, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 13. The I.L.C.
was created by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948. It is presently comprised of a group
of 34 distinguished experts in international law who are charged with drafting proposals
for international conventions. For more information on the I.L.C., see
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/.
255 U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 249, Preamble.
256 Finke, supra note 3, at 871. Finke notes that this is not a new revelation.
Lauterpacht argued in 1951 that state practice on jurisdictional immunity was too
inconsistent to constitute customary law. See id at 870 (referencing Lauterpacht, The
Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 161, at 227-28).
257 U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 249, art. 5.
258 See id art. 7, (providing that a state cannot invoke immunity if it has "expressly
consented to the exercise of jurisdiction" by international agreement, contract, or
declaration); id. art. 8 (providing that a state cannot claim immunity if it has initiated
proceedings or intervened in proceedings in another state's courts); id art. 9 (providing
that a State cannot claim immunity for counterclaims arising out of the same facts or
relationship as a principle claim); id art. 10 (reiterating the commercial exception); id.
art. 11 (providing that immunity cannot be claimed in litigation involving certain labor
contracts); id. art. 12 (containing the tort exception); id. art. 13 (containing some
property related exceptions, such as when there is immovable property in the forum
state's territory); id. art. 14 (providing that a state cannot invoke immunity for claims
involving intellectual property); id art. 15 (providing that immunity cannot be claimed in
where the state wishing to claim immunity has participated in certain international
organizations or companies, and a dispute between that organization on the forum state
arises); id art. 16 (refering to maritime disputes and states' ownership of ships); id. art.
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exception,25 are uncontroversial. Article 12 contains a tort
exception which appears very broad in scope. It reads:
Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State
cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction before a court of
another State which is otherwise competent in a proceeding
which relates to pecuniary compensation for death or injury of
the person, or damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by
an act or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the
State, if the act or omission occurred in whole or in part in the
territory of that other State and if the author of the act or
omission was present in that territory at the time of the act or
omission.260
ILC commentary notes that the exception to immunity
contained in Article 12 "is applicable only to cases or
circumstances in which the State concerned would have been
liable under the lex loci delicti commissi [the law at the place
where the tort occurred]."261  However, "the State is as a rule
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State, for
this exceptional provision immunity is withheld."2 62  This tort
exception gives the individuals wrongfully harmed the ability to
sue a foreign state in their own domestic courts, provided the tort
took place "in whole or in part" in the forum state.2 63 The plain
language of this article appears to broaden the scope of immunity
exceptions to include an individual's suit against a foreign state for
human rights violations, such as those that might occur during
armed conflict. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee
introducing its report on the proposed convention to the General
Assembly stated, however, that acts or omissions of the armed
17 (providing that a State cannot claim immunity when it has agreed to submit a
commercial matter to arbitration).
259 Id. art. 10. If a State engages in a commercial transaction with a foreign natural
or juridical person and, by virtue of the applicable rules of private international law,
differences relating to the commercial transaction fall within the jurisdiction of a court of
another State, the State cannot invoke immunity from that jurisdiction in a proceeding
arising out of that commercial transaction. Id.
260 Id. art. 12.
261 See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 43d sess, Apr. 29-Julyl9, 1991, 2, U.N.
Doc. A146/10 (1991) [hereinafter I.L.C. Rep., 43d sess].
262 Id.
263 Id. T 3.
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forces were not covered by the convention.2 64
Article 12 is clearly intended to provide compensation for
individuals that otherwise would be barred from suing a state
because of jurisdictional immunity. The ICL commentary noted:
[T]he most convenient court is that of the State where the delict
was committed. A court foreign to the scene of the delict might
be considered as a forum non conveniens. The injured individual
would have been without recourse to justice had the State been
entitled to invoke its jurisdictional immunity.2 6 5
There is no language in the U.N. Convention excluding abuses
of human rights or jus cogens; on the other hand, there is no
language expressly including such acts, and one might expect that
such a significant development of such a pivotal issue in
international law would be made clear.2 66 Courts interpreting the
tort article of the U.N. Convention have construed it narrowly,
even when jus cogens violations are in play. For example, Lord
Bingham of Cornhill addressed the U.N. Convention in Jones v.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and stated:
[T]he UN Immunity convention of 2004 provides no exception
from immunity where civil claims are made based on acts of
torture. The Working Group in its 1999 Report makes plain that
such an exception was considered, but no such exception was
agreed. Despite its embryonic status, this Convention is the most
authoritative statement available on the current international
understanding of the limits of state immunity in civil cases, and
the absence of a torture or jus cogens exception is wholly
inimical to the claimants' contention. 267
264 U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 6th comm., 13th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/59/SR.13.
265 See I.L.C. Rep., 43d sess, supra note 261, art. 12(2). It is unclear whether an
individual would be required to exhaust remedies available in the offending state before
seeking redress in one's own court system as is customary. See, RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: REMEDIES FOR INJURY TO
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES § 713, cmt. f. (1987) ("[A] state is not required to
consider a claim by another state for an injury to its national until that person has
exhausted domestic remedies .... "). There is an exception to this: The requirement of
exhaustion is waived when "such remedies are clearly sham or inadequate, or their
application is unreasonably prolonged." Id.
266 See, e.g., U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 249.
267 Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya [2006]
UKHL 26, [2006] 129 I.L.R 713, 727 (U.K.).
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In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (discussed infra at
Part VIII), Germany persuaded the ICJ that the ILC discussed the
applicability of Article 12 to human rights abuses caused by
military forces in armed conflict-and rejected that argument.268
The commentary approved by the ILC upon its adoption of the
Convention's draft articles in 1991 supported that contention in
part, but it also added confusion. The commentary stated:
The areas of damage envisaged in article 12 are mainly
concerned with accidental death or physical injuries to persons
or damage to tangible property involved in traffic accidents,
such as moving vehicles, motor cycles, locomotives or
speedboats. In other words, the article covers most areas of
accidents involved in the transport of goods and passengers by
rail, road, air or waterways. Essentially, the rule of non-
immunity will preclude the possibility of the insurance company
hiding behind the cloak of State immunity and evading its
liability to the injured individuals.269
However, the commentary further articulated, "In addition, the
scope of Article 12 is wide enough to also cover intentional
physical harm such as assault and battery, malicious damage to
property, arson or even homicide, including political
assassination." 27 0  The ILC commentary also expressed some
members' reservations on the draft of article 12 for the U.N.
Convention because some members felt that the torts encompassed
in Article 12 would be more "effectively .. . secured by
negotiations through diplomatic channels or by insurance."2 '
Interestingly, the final paragraph of the ILC's commentary noted,
"Some members expressed reservations about the very broad
scope of the article and on the consequences it might have for
State responsibility." 2 7 2
Although the ICJ considered in ILC commentary, in
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, one scholar has aptly noted
268 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 72 (June 12, 2008).
269 See 1.L.C. Rep., 43d sess, supra note 261, art. 12(4) (citing 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n, 13, U.N. Doc A/54/10; (1991)).
270 Id. (referencing Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980)).
271 Id. art. 12(11).
272 Id.
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that the authoritative value of the commentary is dubious.27 3
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT), which is binding on states who are parties to the treaty or
bound by it through customary international law,274 stipulates that
a treaty must be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose." 27 5 The ordinary meaning of
tort is not limited to car accidents. Therefore, relying on ILC
commentary for clarification would conflict with another article of
the Vienna Convention. VCLT Article 12 explains that
preparatory work can be used as a supplemental means of
interpretation only when the interpretation of the treaty provision,
in accordance with Article 32, remains ambiguous or absurd.2 76
But, as one scholar noted, it "is hardly a manifestly absurd and
unreasonable result to include personal injuries caused by the
armed forces of another state on the territory of the forum state if
this actually reflects the current practice of at least some states."2 77
It is unfortunate that the ILC provided the international
community with such inept guidance. This is particularly so
given that the ILC actually established a working group to
examine whether a human rights abuse exception should be
included in the U.N. Convention.27 8 The working group did not
273 See Finke, supra note 3, at 863.
274 See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7
(Sept. 15) (applying the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to the dispute, even
though neither state party was a member of the convention because the convention
reflected customary international law); Frequently Asked Questions About Vienna
Convention on Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/701 39.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
275 V.C.L.T., supra note 8, art. 31.
276 See Finke, supra note 3, at 863; V.C.L.T., supra note 8, art. 32 ("Recourse may
be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of article 3 1, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation
according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.").
277 Finke, supra note 3, at 863. Finke also notes that the General Assembly,
through Resolution 59/38 of Dec. 2, 2004, did not adopt all of the commentary. What
was and was not adopted is somewhat ambiguous.
278 Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 51st sess., 3 May-23 July, 1999, at 155, 9,
U.N. Doc A/54/10; GAOR 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1991), reprinted in [1999] 2 Y.B.
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reach consensus27 9 and so avoided this issue, suggesting that the
ILC knew well that there would be uncertainty in the international
community as to the scope of the U.N. Convention's exceptions to
immunity.
The scope of Article 12 of the U.N. convention on immunity is
still unknown and may be one reason why many states have not
adopted it. Some states that have adopted it have felt a need to
express their belief, upon ratification, that Article 12 is quite
narrow. When Norway ratified the convention, it entered a
declaration28 explaining its understanding that the U.N.
Convention "does not apply to military activities, including the
activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms
are understood under international humanitarian law and activities
undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their
official duties." 281 Similarly, Sweden entered a declaration upon
ratification, stating its "understanding that the Convention does
not apply to military activities . . . ." I should not come as a
surprise that Norway and Sweden expressed their understandings
in this manner; both states contribute heavily to peace-keeping
missions abroad.283 It is the states that deploy their militaries in
foreign states (for peace-keeping or for conquest) that have the
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.1 (Part 2).
279 Id.at172, 13.
280 It is important to recognize that these States were entering declarations, and not
reservations. When a state ratifies only parts of a convention, those parts which it
refuses to be bound by are reservations. Interpretative declarations are the
understandings a state expresses as to a treaty's intent and applicability. See generally
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 50th sess., Apr. 20-June 12, July 27-Aug. 14, 1998 U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/49 I /Add.4.
281 See U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 249, at 2.
282 Id
283 Norway has contributed troops to twenty-five U.N. Peace-Keeping operations
since 1945. It currently has troops in Afghanistan and South Sudan. Peacekeaping
Operations, NORWAY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.norway-
un.org/NorwayandUN/Norwegian-UN-Politcies/PeaceOperations/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2012). For similar information on Sweden, see Sweden and the United Nations,
PERMANENT MISSION OF SWEDEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.int/sweden/pages/sweden.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). Norway is also
a member of NATO. NATO Member Countries, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION (May 10, 2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/natocountries.htm
(last visited Nov 5. 2012).
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most to lose by a waiver of immunity for activities ostensibly jure
imperii. The problem of Article 12 and the states' responsibility
for the wrongs of its armed forces deployed for peace-keeping or
peace-enforcing missions should perhaps have been handled
differently. The deployment of armed forces is an act jure imperii.
However, such deployments are not immune to the principles of
humanitarian law or human rights law as jus cogens. Such
deployments may be subject to the exception in which the U.N.
creates an administrative tribunal to exclusively respond to
specific claims that emerge from such deployments, together with
a compensation scheme.284 This could also include the possibility
of insurance for certain classes of wrongs. This would be in
keeping with the element of public government function and the
expectation of fairness to the victims.28 5 The problem should not
have been collapsed into the general tort exception because it has
elements of both a public and a private character that cannot be
easily distinguished.2 86
B. Additional Conventions on Jurisdictional Immunity
The European Convention on State Immunity (European
Convention) seeks to codify and standardize states' treatment of
jurisdictional immunity across Europe.28 7 Unlike the U.N.
Convention, the European Convention has entered into force,
though it has only been ratified by eight states, with the most
recent state (Germany) doing so more than two decades ago.288 In
comparison to the U.N. Convention, the European Convention
explicitly excludes the derogation of immunity for acts committed
by armed forces in the territory of the forum state."8 Article 31 of
the European Convention states, "Nothing in this Convention shall
284 See I.L.C. Rep., 43d sess, supra note 261, at 115 (explaining commission
considered compensation scheme regarding injury to a State).
285 Seeid atil6241.
286 See Caplan, supra note 2, at 775.
287 European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, C.E.T.S. No. 074, 11
I.L.M. 470 (1972).
288 The status of the D.C.S.I. is available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=074&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Nov.
5,2012).
289 European Convention on State Immunity, supra note 287, at art. 31.
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affect any immunities or privileges enjoyed by a Contracting State
in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by, or in relation
to, its armed forces when on the territory of another Contracting
State."29 0 Since the European Convention preceded the U.N.
Convention, it is tempting to find significance in the absence of a
military-excluding provision from the U.N. Convention. The
drafters of the U.N. Convention were no doubt aware of the
European Convention and the inapplicability of its tort exception
to activities of armed forces committed in the forum state.
Draft conventions, such as those by the Institute de Droit
International and the International Law Association (ILA),
explicitly provide for pecuniary compensation for certain torts.291
The Institute de Droit International passed a Resolution on State
Immunity in 1999 also containing a tort exception.29 2 The ILA
Draft Convention on State Immunity, adopted in Buenos Aires in
1994, contains a tort exception, which is broader than those of the
other conventions, because it only requires the damage "and the
act or omission which caused the death, injury or damage either
occurred wholly or partly in the forum State or if that act or
omission had a direct effect in the forum state" (emphasis
added).2 93 The U.N. Convention, conversely, does not extend to
torts that were committed outside the forum state's territory, even
if they had a direct effect in the forum state.294 The Organization
of American States has also been drafting an immunity treaty.295
The force of these conventions is questionable, given states'
sparse ratification of them. 296 If the tort exceptions contained in
these conventions do not apply to military activities, then
customary international law governs the application of immunity
for acta jure imperii.2 97 Not all jus cogens violations will be
290 Id
291 Saba, supra note 208, at 98.
292 Id. at 99.
293 International Law Association: Draft Convention on State Immunity, art. III, 22
I.L.M. 287 (1983) (emphasis added).
294 Saba, supra note 208, at 101.
295 See International Law Association: Draft Convention on State Immunity, art. III,
22 1.L.M. 287, 292 (1983).
296 Saba, supra note 208, at 102.
297 Id. at 99.
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committed by military forces, of course, but a conflict
environment creates an atmosphere ripe for atrocities. These
conventions do not offer clear guidance on jurisdictional immunity
questions, and therefore the doctrine has been heavily influenced
by the holdings of state courts. What, then, is the solution to the
signals about the scope of wrongs immunized from the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity? When viewed in isolation, the
signals are ambiguous and essentially provide for a legal vacuum,
a circumstance that law generally discourages.2 98 The solution to
this problem requires that the idea of sovereign immunity be
appropriately contextualized to account for a broader social and
political reality.299 Taking that broader perspective, it becomes
clear that the values that sustain the global community's
constitutional order are implicated. This starting point provides
perspectives that more explicitly bring to the enquirer's lens the
different streams of expectation creating international law that
ultimately have to be integrated and reconciled with the
fundamental values of the global constitutional order.300 This
requires clarification of the law that illuminates its
incompleteness, supplementation of the gaps and ambiguities by
reference to the more comprehensive basic values of the system,
and, finally, integration of a defensible prescriptive norm with the
fundamental value postulates of the international system, which
completes the element of law making.3 0 '
VIII. Courts Addressing Human Rights Exceptions to
Immunity
Jus cogens and jurisdictional immunity have clashed before
298 See generally Caplan, supra note 2, at 760 (citing Daniel J. Michalchuk, Filling
A Legal Vacuum: The Form and Content ofRussia's Future State Immunity Law
Suggestions for Legislative Reform, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 487, 497 (2001))
(explaining Russia's lack of state immunity law created a legal vacuum that eventually
led to transition from absolute immunity to a restrictive approach).
299 See generally id. at 761 (explaining that various countries approach immunity
issues in different ways demonstrating that there are various factors and issues inherent
in these problems).
300 See generally id. (citing Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in
Europe, 5 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 51, 61 (1992)) (explaining a unifying consensus of
foreign state immunity law exists only at a "rather high level of abstraction").
301 See generally supra Part I (explaining the Modem Communications Theory).
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several national and international courts in recent years. As
Brownlie put it, "There is a persistent tension in the case law
between the profile of state immunity and the principles of human
rights."302 The way that the courts have judged the two principles
has varied greatly. As one treatise concludes, "few, if any,
chapters of international law have been more developed by the
case law of domestic courts than State immunity." 30 3
A. Princz
The federal district court in Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany304 was, in 1992, the first court to find that sovereign
immunity must give way in the face of grave human rights abuses.
There, a Jewish American citizen had been arrested while in
Eastern Europe during World War II.305 He was forced into slave
labor by the Nazis and survived the concentration and
extermination camps of Aushwitz, Birkenau, and Dachau.306
Following the completion of the war, the Federal Republic of
Germany set up a reparation system to compensate victims of Nazi
atrocities, but for various reasons, including his American
citizenship, Mr. Princz was not compensated.3 07 The U.S. State
Department and several Congressional delegations failed to
persuade Germany to voluntarily pay reparations to Mr. Princz.*
Finally, in 1992, Mr. Princz initiated suit against Germany in the
federal district court of Washington, D.C.30 ' Germany argued that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity, because no FSIA exception applied to human rights
abuses committed during wartime, and all questions of immunity
in U.S. courts had to be considered within the FSIA framework.3 10
302 BROWNUE, supra note 32, at 347.
303 Saba, supra note 208, at 102. (citing Andrea Bianchi, Denying State Immunity to
Violators ofHuman Rights, 46 AUSTRIAN J. OF PUB. INT'L LAW, 195, 195-229 (1994)).
304 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992).
305 Princz v. Federal Republic of Gennany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
306 Id
307 Id
308 Id.
309 Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 33.
310 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1169.
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The plaintiff did not directly rely upon jus cogens in Princz
because there is no current jus cogens exception in the FSIA
(though there have been proposals to amend FSIA to include such
an exception).3 1 ' Rather, the plaintiff argued that Germany's
immunity was waived by the commercial activity exception of the
FSIA when the Nazis forced the plaintiff into slave labor.312 In the
alternative, Mr. Princz argued that Germany had implicitly waived
its immunity by engaging in gravely reprehensible acts. 13
Nevertheless, the district court was clearly emphasizing jus cogens
norms when it held that the FSIA "has no role to play where the
claims alleged involve undisputed acts of barbarism committed by
a one-time outlaw nation which demonstrated callous disrespect
for the humanity of an American citizen, simply because he was
Jewish." 314 Therefore, the international common law applied, and
the court suggested that this would support an implicit waiver of
jurisdictional immunity on Germany's part.315
The district court's holding stood for only two years before the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the
decision in an opinion authored by now Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court Ruth Bader Ginsburg.3 16 Ginsburg wrote that the
implied waiver exception in the FSIA did not apply to the case
because there was no evidence showing that Germany had
"indicated, even implicitly, a willingness to waive immunity for
actions arising out of the Nazi atrocities."3 17 In other words, under
the U.S. statutory regime, waiver has a mens rea component, and
waiver must be intentionally initiated by the state over which
jurisdiction is claimed. 318  Although the case was short lived,
Princz influenced a growing group of jurists uncomfortable with
granting sovereign immunity to foreign states when it is used to
311 See generally Belsky et al., supra note 42 (proposing amendments to the FSIA,
including ajus cogens exception).
312 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1173; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
313 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
314 Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 26.
315 See Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 75.
316 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1166.
317 Id. at 1174.
318 Cf Ipitrade Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C.
1978) (finding that Nigeria implicitly waived immunity).
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insulate international wrongs from accountability.3 19 Although
Princz ultimately lost, the Princz court provided an approach to
sovereign immunity that points the way to a comprehensive
analysis rooted in the basic values of international legal order.
This was an important authority signal about the relevance of legal
expectations emerging from other areas of international law
having an influence on the scope and reach of sovereign
immunity.
B. Distomo
The next state court to waive immunity for jus cogens
violations committed during armed conflict was the Greek Areio
Pagos (Hellenic Supreme Court) in Prefecture of Voiotia v. The
Federal Republic of Germany (the Distomo case) decided in
2000.320 There, Greek plaintiffs sued Germany for human rights
wrongs that occurred in the Second World War.3 21 After eighteen
German soldiers were killed by Greek partisans during the final
months of Germany's occupation of Greece, Nazi soldiers
retaliated against civilians in the nearby village of Distomo.3 2 2
The village was razed, and more than 200 civilians were killed,
mostly women, children, and the elderly.3 23 A half-century later,
relatives of the victims sought compensation in Greek courts.324 A
lower court in the town of Livadia found that an exception to
immunity applied when a state's armed forces commit human
319 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1177.
320 Court of First Instance of Livadeia, 137/1997 (October 30, 1997) translated in
50 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 595 (1997) (with note by Maria
Gavouneli) [hereinafter Distomo]. For an analysis of the decision, see Ilias Bantekas,
Case Report: Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
765 (1998). In Distomo, the trial court issued a default judgment against Germany, who
then appealed to the Hellenic Supreme Court. Id.
321 Distomo, supra note 320, at 600.
322 See MARK MAZOWER, INSIDE HITLER'S GREECE 213-215 (1993); See generally
Markus Rau, State Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law-The
Distomo Case Before the German Federal Constitutional Court, GERMAN L. J. 2005 Vol
7, No. 7, at 701, available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol07No07/
PDFVol_07_No_07_701-720_DevelopmentsRau.pdf (discussing the Distomo
massacre).
323 Id.
324 Id.
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rights abuses and that customary international law not only
allowed a state's court to deny immunity, but actually required
it.325
The Hellenic court first applied the tort exception of the
European Convention on State Immunity (both Germany and
Greece are parties) and then turned to the application of the
military activities exception. 326  The court reasoned that the
European Convention incorporated pre-existing customary
international laws, including the laws of war.327  The court,
therefore, applied principles from the 1907 Hague IV convention,
which implicitly waived immunity where occupying powers
abused their sovereignty. 328 German forces had abused the power
of sovereignty by committing war crimes. Recalling the reasoning
of the district court in Princz, the court found that Germany had
tacitly waived immunity by breaching peremptory norms of
international law.329 Ultimately, the court found Germany liable
for C27 Million and issued a judgment to that effect, but did not
order Germany to pay.330 Germany appealed the default decision
and invoked jurisdictional immunity, arguing that no judgment on
the merits should have been entered.3 ' The Areios Pagos
dismissed the appeal, effectively affirming the trial court's
325 The decision of the Livadia court has only been published in Greek. See
Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 1113-14; see also Finke, supra note 3, at 862; Distomo,
supra note 320, at 519.
326 See Saba, supra note 208, at 108-09.
327 See Distomo, supra note 320, at 599-601.
328 Article 43 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention on the Laws and
Customs of War states that "[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed
into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907,
187 C.T.S. 227, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument; see
also, Saba, supra note 208, at 109.
329 Distomo, supra note 320, at 599.
330 Id.
331 See Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.,
Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, T 23 (June 12, 2009).
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decision.3 32
The plaintiffs then sought to have their judgment enforced.
Greek civil procedure, however, requires the authorization of the
Minister of Justice before a judgment against a foreign state can be
enforced; the Minister refused to do so.3 33  Consequently, the
judgment remained unexecuted in Greece.334 Thereupon, the
plaintiffs took their judgment before the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR). 3 s The plaintiffs invoked Article 6(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights, contending that their
right to judicial protection had been violated.3 36 In the 2002
Kalogeropoulou decision, the ECHR dismissed the case, citing
sovereign immunity. The Court stated that it could "not find it
established ... that there is yet acceptance in international law of
the proposition that States are not entitled to immunity in respect
of civil claims for damages brought against them in another State
for crimes against humanity." 337  In Jurisdictional Immunities of
the State, Italy stressed the word "yet" in the ECHR's decision,
suggesting that a rule by which states are not entitled to immunity
when they commit human rights violations was in the process of
emerging.3
Following Kalogeropoulou, the Distomo plaintiffs took their
judgment to the courts of several European states-including
332 Id. 34.
333 Id. 35; see also, KODIKAS POLITIKEs DIKONOMIAS [KPOL.D.] [CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEEDURE]: 923 (Greece).
334 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening), 2012
I.C.J. 143, 31 (Feb. 3).
335 See Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, App. No. 59021/00, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 417,
129 I.L.R. 537 (2002).
336 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, avaliable at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b04.html. Article 6(1) states that "[i]n the
determination of his civil rights and obligations of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
337 Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, App. No. 59021/00, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Admissibility Decision of Dec. 12, 2002) (emphasis added).
338 Counter-memorial of Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.,
Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 1$ 4.97-4.98 (Dec. 22, 2009).
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Germany339-before turning to Italy.3 40 In 2008, Italy's Corte di
Cassazione declared that the Greek judgment was enforceable in
Italy,3 4 ' but the thrust of the Distomo decision met with mixed
receptions elsewhere. In a 2001 decision, the Constitutional Court
of Slovenia, for example, addressed the issue of whether a state
could waive immunity for violations of human rights, and found
that it could not.3 42 The Court declared that the Greek Distomo
decision did not
serve as a proof of general state practice recognized as a law and
thus as the creation of a rule of international customary law,
which would in the case of violations of the cogent norms of
international law in the area of human rights protection as a
consequence of state activities in the framework of iure
imperii . . . allow [state] courts to try foreign states in such
cases. 343
Indeed, two years after the Distomo decision, the Anotato
Eidiko Diskastirio (Special Supreme Court) of Greece heard the
Margellos case.3 44 Similar to Distomo, the case concerned human
rights violations committed by German forces in Greece during
World War II.345 In Margellos, however, the Greek court reversed
course and concluded that Germany was entitled to immunity.34 6
It stated: "This court cannot itself formulate such a rule or confirm
its existence in the absence of clear evidence from international
practice. Nor can the Court extrapolate such a rule from the
339 Bundesgerichtshof, [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] III ZR 245/98, June 26,
2003, 129 ILR (2007) 556, affirmed by the German Constitutional Court,
Bundesgerichtshof BverfG, 2 BvR 1476/03, Feb. 15, 2006.
340 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 37 (June 12, 2009).
341 Counter-memorial of Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.,
Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 2.39 (Dec. 22, 2009).
342 See Constitutional Court of Slovenia Mar. 8, 2001, Codices SLO-2001-1-001,
28/2001 Uradni list RS (Official Gazette), available at
http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll/CODICES/precis/eng/eur/slo/slo-2001-1 -
001 ?f--templates$fn=document-frame.htm$3.0#JDE_SLO-2001 -1-001.
343 Id.
344 Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio [A.E.D.] [Special Supreme Court] 6/2002 (Greece),
translated in Margellos v. Germany 129 I.L.R. 526 (2007).
345 Id
346 Id.
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principle that States are liable to pay compensation for violations
of the laws of war on land."3 47 Because of the unique system of
Greek courts, Margellos did not overturn Distomo, however.3 48
Like Princz, Distomo brought to light the rising disunity within the
international community about how to reconcile these competing
norms of sovereign immunity and fundamental human rights.
C. Ferrini
The Italian Corte di Cassazione is the most active court in
exercising jurisdiction over states for acta jure imperii.3 4 9 Except
for Belgium, it is interesting that the Italian courts were the first to
recognize the commercial activities exception.3 50 The Corte di
Cassazione has shown the same pioneering assertiveness in cases
of human rights violations. The most important case on immunity
decided by a state court was the Italian decision, Ferrini v.
Federal Republic of Germany.3"' That case involved an Italian
plaintiff, Luigi Ferrini, who had been arrested in Italy in August
1944 and deported to Germany, where he was forced to labor in
the Nazi armaments industry until the end of the war.352 Although
the case was heard nearly sixty years after the fact, the Italian
court held that Germany waived its immunity by engaging in
gravely reprehensible acts.353 The Court never explicitly
mentioned jus cogens, but its invocation was implicit throughout
347 Id. at 533.
348 Id.
349 See, e.g., Ferrini v. Republica Federale di Germania, Cass., XX. un, 11 Marzo
2004, n.5044 [hereinafter Ferrini], reprinted in 128 I.L.R. 658 (extending jurisdiction
over Germany for the actions of its government)
350 See R. VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 14 (2008); see
generally Dralle v. Czechoslovakia, 17 INT'L L. REP. 155 (1950) (discussing the history
of the commercial exception).
351 Ferrini, 128 I.L.R. at 658.
352 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, T 16 (June 12, 2009); see also Tomuschat, supra note 222,
at 1107-10 (describing the historical background of Italy-Germany relations during
World War II).
353 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, T 16 (June 12, 2009).
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the opinion.3" Although both Ferrini and Distomo reached the
same result, the reasoning of the two courts was quite different."'
The Italian court first invoked Article 41(2) of the ILC Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts.35 6 Draft articles have not yet been adopted by states, but
their importance should not be discredited. They represent
indications of emerging expectations of legal development. By
resolution, the General Assembly requested that the ILC study the
issue of state responsibility for international wrongful acts."
Draft articles are not binding on state courts, but they are
persuasive. Article 41(2) provides that "no State shall recognize as
lawful a situation created by a serious breach [of jus cogens
norms], nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that
situation.""' Therefore, a court would be violating this obligation
by affording a state jurisdictional immunity. The Ferrini court
further held that certain violations of human rights had developed
in customary international law that would permit derogation of
immunity."' In other words, sovereign immunity must yield tojus
cogens norms. The Corte di Cassazione held that fundamental
human rights
are protected by norms, from which no derogation is permitted,
which lie at the heart of the international order and prevail over
all conventional and customary norms, including those, which
relate to State immunity .... The recognition of immunity from
jurisdiction . .. for such misdeeds stand in stark contrast to
[this] . . . analysis, in that such recognition does not assist, but
rather impedes, the protection of those norms and
354 See Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 1127.
355 Saba, supra note 208, at 110. In fact, the Italian Court criticized the Hellenic
court's "tacit waiver" reasoning. Id.; Ferrini, 128 1.L.R., at 668 § 8; this is also in line
with the D.C. Court of Appeals decision in Princz, discussed infra at part VI(a) (finding
that a state must intend to waive immunity).
356 Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc A/56/10, at art. 41(2)
[hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddb8f804.html.
357 G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), GAOR 8th sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/799(VIII) (Dec. 7,
1953).
358 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 356, at art. 41(2).
359 Ferrini, 128 I.L.R. at 659.
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principles . . . . There is no doubt that a contradiction between
two equally binding legal norms ought to be resolved by giving
precedence to the norm with the highest status. [i.e. jus
cogens]360
Following Ferrini, Italian Courts entered more judgments
against Germany in similar cases and actually put a lien on the
Villa Vigoni, a German-owned property located in Italy. 6 ' The
Corte di Cassazione issued several orders on May 29, 2008,
including Mantelli and Maietta, where the Italian court admitted:
[A]t this time, there exists no definite and explicit international
custom according to which the immunity of the foreign State
from civil jurisdiction with regard to acts performed by it jure
imperii ... could be deemed to have been derogated from in
respect of acts of such gravity as to qualify as 'crimes against
humanity.' 362
The court then boldly stated that it was contributing "to the
emergence of a rule shaping the immunity of the foreign State."363
Further, the Court stated, "it could be presumed that a principle
limiting the immunity of a State which has committed crimes
against humanity was 'in the process of formation."'
364
The Government of Italy was not as enthusiastic as the courts
in redefining the nature of immunity. The Avvocatura Generale
dello Stato (Solicitor General of Italy) submitted to the Corte di
Cassazione his belief that the 2008 rulings constituted "an unicum
[unique example] in jurisprudential panorama, be it national or
international", and that they do "not seem to be in line with the
current position of international law although [the decisions]
emphasizes some relevant aspects . . . ."" The Italian cases
represent an important expansion of individuals' rights.
360 Id.
361 See Cass., sez. un., 29 maggio 2008, n.14201; see also Memorial of Germany,
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143,
39-40 (June 12, 2009) (noting that Italy attached a judicial mortgage to the Villa Vigoni,
a German owned, but Italian managed cultural exchange center located in Italy).
362 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 39-40 (June 12, 2009)
363 See id. 1 27.
364 See id. TT 18, 19.
365 Id. 127.
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Heretofore, when a state has committed a wrong against an
individual of another state, such as jus cogens violations
committed by armies in war, the responsibility of the offending
state has been to the State of the victimized individual and not to
the individual.36 6 The Ferrini line of cases purport to give
individuals who have been egregiously abused claims of their
own.
D. Jones
The Ferrini decision met with hostility in many other state
courts, particularly in the United Kingdom. In Jones v. Ministry of
Interior Al-Mamalaka Al-Arabiya AS Sandiya,3 67 adjudicated by
the U.K. House of Lords, Lord Hoffmann wagged a finger at the
Italian court, stating that international law "is based upon the
common consent of nations. It is not for a national court to
'develop' international law by unilaterally adopting a version of
that law which, however desirable, forward-looking and reflective
of values it may be, is simply not accepted by other states." 3 6 8
In Jones, an Iranian citizen, who later gained British
citizenship, was arrested in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on suspicion
that he had detonated a bomb in the city center. 36 1 He spent the
next sixty-seven days in a Saudi prison where he claimed he was
systematically tortured.3 "o After returning to England, Jones sued
366 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: REMEDIES FOR INJURIES TO NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES § 713 cmt. a (1987)
("In principle, the responsibility of a state under §§ 711 and 712 is to the state of the
alien's nationality and gives that state a claim against the offending state. The claim
derives from injury to an individual, but once espoused it is the state's claim, and can be
waived by the state."). A state can represent an individual before the court, but
international law requires a certain degree of connection between the individual and the
state. Nottebohm (Lich. v. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) (ruling that Liechtenstein could
not represent a man's claim before the ICJ because the man had no real connection to the
state). In Nottebohm, the Court stated that the person a state is seeking to represent at the
international level must be "more closely attached by his tradition, his establishment, his
interests, his activities, his family ties, his intentions for the near future to [the state
seeking to represent him] .. . than to any other state." Id. at 23.
367 Jones v. Ministry of Interior AI-Mamblaka Al-Araibya AS Sandiya [2006]
UKHL 26, [2006] I.L.R. 713 (U.K.).
368 Id. at 63 (Opinion of Lord Hoffman).
369 See generally, Humes-Schulz, supra note 91, at 105 (discussing the Jones case).
370 Jones, [2006] UKHL 37.
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Saudi Arabia in British courts, seeking compensation on a number
of grounds, including torture.3 7 ' In Jones, the question before the
House of Lords was whether an Iranian could sue in Britain for
alleged acts of torture committed in Saudi Arabia.37 2 The Court
framed the issues as a balance "between the condemnation of
torture as an international crime against humanity and the
principle that states must treat each other as equals not to be
subjected to each other's jurisdiction."7 The judges concluded
that the U.K. courts lacked jurisdiction because of immunity, and
rejected the logic of the Italian courts.374
Lord Bingham wrote, "The Ferrini decision cannot in my
opinion be treated as an accurate statement of international law as
generally understood; and [invoking Aristotle] one swallow does
not make a rule of international law." 7 In rejecting the Ferrini
logic, the House of Lords distinguished Jones from the Pinochet
case, which after all, it had decided. Again, Lord Bingham wrote:
I would not question the correctness of the decision reached by
the majority in Pinochet (No 3). But the case was categorically
different from the present, since it concerned criminal
proceedings falling squarely within the universal criminal
jurisdiction mandated by the Torture Convention and did not fall
within [the SIA]. The essential ratio of the decision, as I
understand it, was that international law could not without
absurdity require criminal jurisdiction to be assumed and
exercised where the Torture Convention conditions were
satisfied and, at the same time, require immunity to be granted
to those properly charged. The Torture Convention was the
mainspring of the decision, and certain members of the House
expressly accepted that the grant of immunity in civil
proceedings was unaffected.37 6
The court found that, in order to defeat immunity and be
covered by the torture convention, the torture must be "official,"
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id. I (quoting Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran [2004] 71 O.R. (3d) T 95, at
675) (Can. Ont. C.A.).
374 Id.
375 Id. 22.
376 Jones, [2006] UKHL 26 22.
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and the plaintiff did not argue that it was. 377  Thus the torture
convention did not apply.378  Of course, from the victim's
perspective, whether the torture was official or not was a wholly
unimportant distinction. A jus cogens norm had been violated,
and no one would be held accountable.
E. Al-Adsani
In a similar case, Al-Adsani, the plaintiff brought suit in
England's High Court against Kuwait, seeking compensation for
alleged acts of torture committed in Kuwait."' Al-Adsani could
not argue that the tort exception of the SIA applied because that
exception recognizes torts committed only in the forum state.380
The plaintiff instead argued that if the United Kingdom did not
deny immunity to Kuwait, then it would be in violation of its
treaty obligations under the European Convention on Human
Rights."' The court disagreed and dismissed the case on the
grounds that Kuwait was entitled to sovereign immunity under the
SIA.382
Al-Adsani then took the case before the ECHR, arguing that
the U.K. courts denied him access to legal process and failed to
protect his right not to be tortured.3  The human rights court
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 AI-Adsani v. Kuwait, 103 I.L.R. 420 (Q.B. 1995), affirmed by the English Court
of Appeal, Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536 (C.A. 1996), reprinted in 34 Eur. Hum.
Rts. Rep. 273, 274. Al-Adsani claimed that Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah Al-Saud AI-Sabah
repeatedly submerged Al-Adsani's head in a pool filled with corpses and that his body
was badly burned when he was forced into a small room, containing a mattress, which
was then set ablaze by the Sheikh. Id. at 277. The alleged torture was purported to have
been in retaliation after AI-Adsani was accused of releasing sexual video tapes involving
the Sheikh. Id.
380 See Finke, supra note 3, at 861-64 (discussing the tort exception to immunity).
381 Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, 34 EUR. HUM. RTs. REP. 273, 273.
382 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). See also, Saba, supra note 208, at 104-05 (noting that
the Al-Adsani case "does not present an example of departure from the [tort rule of the
European Convention on State Immunity or the U.N. Convention on Sovereign
Immunity] . . . . In this case, the English Court of Appeal applied a strict interpretation of
the State Immunity Act 1978 in order to avoid the tort exception provided in Section 5 of
the SIA.").
383 AI-Adsani claimed that, inter alia, U.K. courts had violated Article 6(1) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
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reiterated, "sovereign immunity is a concept of international law,
developed out of the principle par in parem non habet imperium,
by virtue of which one State shall not be subject to the jurisdiction
of another State."384 The ECHR stated that it considered the grant
of jurisdictional immunity to serve the legitimate aims of
international law by promoting "comity and good relations
between States through the respect of another State's
sovereignty.""' Even jus cogens (here, the prohibition on torture)
was not a superior norm to immunity.3 86 The ECHR held:
Notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of
torture in international law, the Court is unable to discern in the
international instruments, juridical authorities or other materials
before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of
international law, a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil
suit in the courts of another State where acts of torture are
alleged.387
But Al-Adsani was decided by the slimmest of margins: nine
against eight." The dissenting judges on the Court were
persuaded to endorse an understanding of immunity where, as one
scholar put it, "a state's jurisdictional immunity is abrogated when
the state violates human rights protections that are considered
peremptory international law norms."3 89 The dissenting judges in
supra note 336.
384 AI-Adsani v. Kuwait, 34 EUR. HUM. RTs. REP. 273, 289.
385 Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 54; McElhinney
v. Ireland, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 35.
386 Id.
387 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 61 (joint dissenting
opinion of Judges Rozakis, Caflishc, Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Vajid).
Regarding the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court stated, "the
Convention, including article 6, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. The Court must be
mindful of the Convention's special character as a human rights treaty, and it must also
take the relevant rules of international law into account. The convention should so far as
possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms
part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity." AI-Adsani v. United
Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 55.
388 Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 1138.
389 Caplan, supra note 2, at 741 (explaining the theory: "because state immunity is
not jus cogens, it ranks lower in the hierarchy of international law norms, and therefore
can be overcome when ajus cogens norm is at stake"). Id.
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Al-Adsani reasoned that a state should not be able to "hide behind
the rules on State immunity to avoid proceedings for a serious
claim of torture made before a foreign jurisdiction."390  They
further stated their belief that "the acceptance . . . of thejus cogens
nature of the prohibition of torture entails that a State allegedly
violating it cannot invoke hierarchically lower rules (in this case,
those on State immunity) to avoid the consequences of the
illegality of its actions."3 91 The dissent reasoned that sovereign
immunity cannot bar claims that are jus cogens in nature since the
latter represents "the basic values of the international community
[and] cannot be subject to unilateral or contractual forms of
derogation from their imperative contents."3 92
F. McElhinney and Other Cases
In McElhinney v. Ireland, decided the same day as Al-Adsani,
the ECHR clarified that jurisdictional immunity still applies to
claims arising out of military activities.39  There, a civil suit was
filed in the Irish High Court against a British soldier and the
British Secretary of the State of North Ireland.3 94 The Secretary
invoked immunity.3 95 The plaintiff argued the tort exception to
immunity applied.39 6 The ECHR found that jus imperii applies to
390 Id
391 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, T 3 (joint dissenting
opinion of Judges Rozakis, Caflishe, Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Vaji6); Saba,
supra note 208, at I1I ("The characterization of Kuwait's tortious acts as torturer in the
terms of Article 3 of the Convention and the peremptory norm status (fus cogens) of the
prohibition of torture led the minority to argue that if the status of jus cogens has any
meaning it must have the consequence of lifting State immunity in case of breach of such
a norm. Hence, the basic characteristic of ajus cogens norm is to override any other rule
which does not have the same status and, in the event of a conflict between ajus cogens
rule and nay other rule of international law, the former prevails.").
392 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 2 (joint dissenting
opinion of Judges Rozakis, Caflishc, Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Vaji6).
393 McElhinney v. Ireland, 200I-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 32.
394 Saba, supra note 208, at 104. The plaintiff was an Irish police officer who
unintentionally drove into a barrier at a British checkpoint on the Northern Ireland-
Republic of Ireland border. A British officer at the scene fired several gunshots at the
plaintiff. Id.
395 Id.
396 Id
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a soldier's conduct when acting as a state's servant or agent and
that immunity barred the court from asserting jurisdiction-even
for acts that occurred in the forum state.39 7 The Court echoed the
ILC commentary on the U.N. Convention, stating that the
expansion of the tort exception primarily refers to
'insurable' personal injury, that is incidents arising out of
ordinary road traffic accidents, rather than matters relating to the
core area of State sovereignty such as the acts of a soldier on
foreign territory which, of their very nature, may involve
sensitive issues affecting diplomatic relations between States
and national security.398
However, the Court also noted a "trend" in international law
that progressively expands the exceptions to jurisdictional
immunity, though it "is by no means universal.""' In their dissent,
Judges Calfisch, Cabral Barreto, and Vajid characterized the tort
exception as customary international law and more expansive than
merely encompassing traffic accident-related wrongs.4 00 Judge
Loucaides also dissented and added that the law of jurisdictional
immunities
originated at a time when individual rights were practically non-
existent and when States needed greater protection from possible
harassment through abusive judicial proceedings. The doctrine
of State immunity has in modem times been subjected to an
increasing number of restrictions, the trend being to reduce its
application in view of developments in the field of human rights
which strengthen the position of the individual.401
These cases reveal a common theme in jurisdictional immunity
litigation: the cases are decided by narrow margins. In many
cases, the controlling opinion notes the strong undercurrent
emerging in international law flowing against immunity. But the
majority of courts still serve as guardians for the old understanding
of jurisdictional immunity. For example, the Court of Appeal of
397 McElhinney, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 1 32.
398 Id.
399 Id. 38.
400 McElhinney, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 (dissenting opinion of Judges Caflisch,
Cabral Barreto, and Vajid).
401 McElhinney, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37 (dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides,
at para. 4).
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Ontario, Canada ruled in 2004 in another immunities case, Bouzari
v. Iran.40 2 In Bouzari, an Iranian man wished to sue Iran in
Canada for alleged acts of torture that occurred in Iran.40 3 He
argued that a state had an obligation to hear jus cogens cases,
regardless of where the acts alleged occurred (a duty to protect
plus universal jurisdiction argument).4 04 The Ontario Court
disagreed and approved the opinion of the lower court, which
stated:
An examination of the decisions of national courts and
international tribunals, as well as state legislation with respect to
sovereign immunity, indicates that there is no principle of
customary international law which provides an exception from
state immunity where an act of torture has been committed
outside the forum, even for acts contrary to jus cogens. Indeed,
the evidence of state practice, as reflected in these and other
sources, leads to the conclusion that there is an ongoing rule of
customary international law providing state immunity for acts of
torture committed outside the forum state.405
In 2008, Brazilian and Israeli courts both declined to assert
jurisdiction over Germany for events arising out of the Second
World War in cases similar to Distomo and Ferrini, on the
grounds that jurisdictional immunity required the courts to dismiss
the claims.406 Finally, the most recent state courts to pronounce on
immunity include the Polish Supreme Court, which decided the
Natoniewski case in 2010.407 Again, the facts involved claims
against Germany for Nazi human rights violations.4 08 There, a raid
by German soldiers on a Polish village left the plaintiff partially
402 Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2004) 71 O.R.3d 675, 675 (Can. Ont. CA.)
403 Id. at 11.
404 For more on Responsibility to Protect (R2P), see generally, Gareth Evans,
From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 703
(2006) (discussing the development and evolution of the R2P concept).
405 Bouzari, 71 O.R.3d 88 (where the court stated that "jus cogens norms do not
require Congress (or any government) to create jurisdiction").
406 Arraci Barreto v. Germany, 9.7.2008 (Braz.); CA (TA) 2134/07 Irit Tzemach v.
Germany [2009](Isr.).
407 Natoniewski, Judgment of Oct. 29, 2010, Polish Supreme Court, IV CSK
465/09 (Pol.).
408 Id
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disabled with permanent bum scars.4 09 The Polish court strictly
applied jurisdictional immunity and noted that armed conflicts
involve hundreds and thousands of potential plaintiffs and
declared that large scale human rights violations should not be
reduced to individual plaintiffs suing for compensation.4 1 0
State courts are split, with Italy and the Areio Pagos
recognizing an exception to sovereign immunity when superior
norms are violated, while currently, much of the rest of the world
refuses to do so. Ferrini is not a judicial albatross. It may perhaps
be premature, but it presciently shows the direction in which
customary international law on immunity is heading. As one
treatise notes, "With respect to State immunity and [its
exceptions], it is not possible to conclude from the analysis of the
international instruments together with the judicial decisions both
at the domestic and international levels the existence of a clear
rule in this regard."4 11 Courts that have refused to apply a jus
cogens exception have generally noted a narrowing of immunity
but find that state practice is not yet sufficiently compelling to
represent customary international law.412 Given the recent
decision of the ICJ, that will likely remain the state of
jurisdictional immunity, for at least a period of time.
IX. Jurisdictional Immunities Case Before the ICJ
On February 3, 2012, the ICJ handed down its judgment in the
Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany
v. Italy: Greece Intervening) (hereinafter Jursidictional
Immunities of the State).413 The case arose in the wake of Ferrini
and other cases, in which Italy ordered Germany to pay
compensation to Italian and Greek victims of Nazi war crimes.4 14
409 See Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 1135.
410 Id.
411 Saba, supra note 208, at 112.
412 Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Jus Cogens, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1073, 1092 (2011) (discussing, in particular, the ICJ opinion in Arrest
Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 3 (Feb. 14)).
413 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143 (Feb. 3).
414 See generally, Annalisa Ciampi, The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil
Jurisdiction over Germany in a Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War: The
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In fact, Germany stated that the claims of almost 500 plaintiffs
were pending in Italian courts at the time the ICJ began hearing
the case. 415 The question before the Court, as framed by Germany,
was whether Italy violated international law by denying Germany
jurisdictional immunity in these cases. 4 16  Germany initiated the
proceedings417 and argued that such mass torts should be dealt with
by "diplomatic negotiation and intergovernmental agreements.""
The German memorial to the ICJ cited the U.S. case, Hwang
Geum Joo v. Japan, where the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit stated that, in a matter involving the claims of Chinese
"comfort women" of World War II: "There is no question that this
court is not the appropriate forum in which plaintiffs may seek to
reopen those [legal matters] a half century later . .. the current
claims of the 'comfort women' [should] be addressed directly
between governments."4 19
Germany argued in its memorial that:
To individualize the settlement of war damages by granting
every victim a separate claim is a particularly bad solution
because domestic judges in the "victim countries" are generally
overzealous in allocating to their nationals huge amounts of
financial compensation which could easily exceed the financial
capabilities of a debtor State.420
Civitella Case, 7 J. INT. CRIM. JUST. 597-615 (2009), available at
http://jicj.oxfordjoumals.org/content/7/3/597.full.pdf.html.
415 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, T 45 (June 12, 2009).
416 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 37, 38 (Feb. 3).
417 Germany initiated proceedings before the ICJ in 2008, challenging Italy's
refusal to afford Germany immunity. See Application Instituting Proceedings,
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J 143
(Dec. 23). Greece requested permission to intervene in the proceedings.
418 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 43 (June 12, 2009).
419 Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 72 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001) rev'd on other
grounds, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
420 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 190 (June 12, 2009); see also Tomuschat, supra note 222,
at 1131 (stating that "[t]he national judges of a victim country are generally ill-suited to
administer justice in an impartial and objective way. These judges will always be under
hard pressure form their own population.").
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As Germany suggested, "no one should be able to destabilize
the delicate balance reached [at the end of conflict] by instituting
reparation claims before his/her own courts." 4 2 1  Germany
essentially claimed that the type of large scale compensation
claims that arise out of armed conflict are best dealt with by states
through inter-governmental negotiation in states' traditional role
as arbitrators and advocates of their peoples' disputes.
Unlimited compensation claims ordered to be paid by a co-
equal state, Germany argued, could lead to strained relations,
counter-claims, and escalation of conflicts, perhaps even the
stoking of old animosities.4 22 Germany had settled reparations
claims for various groups by negotiation previously, 423 and they
argued, as the DC court did, that any reparations paid to Mr.
Ferrini and the other plaintiffs should be negotiated by the states
themselves and not ordered by judicial fiat.424 Germany further
sought to characterize the Italian courts as radicals in perfect and
splendid isolation in an otherwise unanimous international
community. Germany argued that, "The courts of one nation
cannot impose their views on all the other nations. International
law is based on consensus. Hegemonic methods are incompatible
with its egalitarian nature."4 25
Italy in turn sought to characterize the dispute as involving the
denial of justice. In their counter-memorial to the Court, Italy
stated that, "The denial of effective reparation by German
authorities, and not the decision of Italian courts with respect to
the jurisdictional immunity of Germany, must be regarded as the
real cause of the present dispute."42 6 Italy also pointed to the many
vocal dissents in cases upholding immunity and to the writings of
421 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 114 (June 12, 2009).
422 See Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 1105.
423 See id. at 1111-13.
424 Memorial of Germany, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 69, 90 (June 12, 2009).
425 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 124 (Feb. 3).
426 Counter-memorial of Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.,
Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, T 2.34 (Dec. 22, 2009).
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academics.42 7 Further, Italy pointed to the ECHR's 2009 decision
in Grozs v. France, where the Court found that the right of access
to justice does not lead to a derogation of sovereign immunity, but
where it also stated that the finding of law at that moment "does
not exclude the future development of customary or treaty law."4 28
Further, the Italians repeatedly stated that "immunity cannot mean
,,121impunity. Whether Germany could negotiate reparations also
ignored the fact that sixty-five years after the fact, Germany had
not done so, at least not for the class of plaintiffs in question. 43 0
The ICJ ultimately ruled in Germany's favor and found that
sovereign immunity barred the claims of Mr. Ferrini and the other
plaintiffs, even for claims jus cogens in nature. 431' The decision
was in keeping with the conservative view the court has previously
articulated on immunity.4 32 Only a decade ago, in Arrest Warrant
of April 11, 2000,433 the ICJ indicated a favorable view of
immunity for current heads of state. 434 Like in the Arrest Warrant
case, in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ made clear
that it considered sovereign immunity to be a procedural right.435
427 Id.
428 Grosz v. France, App. no. 14717/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) p. 78.
429 Counter-memorial of Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.,
Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, 2.34 (Dec. 22, 2009) (quoting Arrest Warrant of
11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 143, $60).
430 See Counter-memorial of Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.
It., Greece Intervening), 2008 I.C.J. 143, IT 1.3, 2.45 (Dec. 22, 2009).
431 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, T 107 (Feb. 3).
432 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3
(setting out a narrow view of sovereign immunity).
433 Id
434 See id. T 51 (where the ICJ stated that "in international law it is firmly
established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking
office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign
Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.").
The court justified the rule on the grounds that it would "ensure the effective
performance of [heads of state's] functions on behalf of their respective States" and that
the rule would "protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another
State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties." Id. 11 53,
54. But see id (dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert), 23 (finding that there
is neither a treaty nor customary international law affording that immunity).
435 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
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Presumably, this is a more slender reed to lean upon than is a
substantive right. Yet the result was to shield the offending actors
from responsibility, which seems to be at odds with the legacy of
Nuremberg.
Surprisingly, in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ
reconciled jus cogens and jurisdictional immunity by finding that
there was no conflict at all. The ICJ held that jurisdictional
immunity was but a procedural rule that determined whether a
state could assert jurisdiction4 3 6 and did not have anything to do
with whether a given act was an international wrong or not. Jus
cogens, the Court said, is a substantive rule that is only at issue
after a state court can successfully assert jurisdiction.437 The result
seems bizarre because a substantive rule of law cannot conflict
with ajus cogens norm, so it does not make sense for a procedural
rule to be able to do what a substantive rule cannot-especially
when procedure is there to give effect to substantive rules in a fair
manner. 43 8  The ICJ sanitized the issue by saying that the
procedural rule of immunity meant that the court never got to the
issue of jus cogens, but the effect on the ground is that sovereignty
trumps jus cogens. As Judge Yusuf argued:
The assessment of whether, in the present case, immunity should
have been granted or could have been denied under international
law by the Italian courts cannot exclude, in my view, the
application of the general principles underlying human rights
and humanitarian law and embodying basic rights such as the
right to an effective remedy, the right to compensation for
damages suffered as a result of breaches of humanitarian
law .... 439
The Court's judgment also belies state practice. Courts, after
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 60 (Feb. 3).
436 Id. at 58 (stating that "the law of immunity is essentially procedural in
nature.").
437 Id.
438 See generally, Janeen M. Carruthers, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of
Laws: A Continuing Debate in Relation to Damages, 53 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 691, 691-711
(2004) (discussing the irony of a procedural rule that conflicts with substantive
international law).
439 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 30 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Judge Yusuf).
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all, do go to the merits of the case to look at the nature of the
dispute in order to determine if one of the exceptions-the tort or
commercial exception, for example-applies. Applying some
exceptions and not others also leads to "the impression of cherry-
picking .. ."440 And further, "State immunity is, as a matter of
fact, as full of holes as Swiss cheese." 441
Although the ICJ gave attention to the jurisprudence of state
courts, it did not go far enough in discovering the wisdom
generated in domestic fora. For example, the ICJ failed to
consider the Erie doctrine developed in American jurisprudence.44 2
The U.S. system is a republic of fifty semi-autonomous states
bound by a federal government, which is analogous to the
international system where nation-states are semi-autonomous but
bound by international law. In 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court
held, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,4 43 that in cases where the
federal courts have jurisdiction based on diversity (a
Constitutional grant of jurisdiction to federal courts for claims
involving parties from different states),4 44 those courts were to
apply state substantive law, but federal procedural law.445 This, of
course, raised the question of which laws are procedural and
which are substantive. To address this question, the courts
developed the "outcome determinative analysis:" if the procedural
rule in question is substantially likely to affect the outcome of the
case, then it is treated as substantive law; if the rule will not likely
affect the outcome, then it is merely procedural. 446 Applying the
outcome determinative approach to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, it is clear that the rule is substantive. One cannot deny
that the highly deferential application of jurisdictional immunity,
as supported by the ICJ, is absolutely outcome determinative and
440 Id 23.
441 Id. 26.
442 See generally 8 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 20:562 (describing the Erie doctrine and
the substantive/procedure test in federal court cases based on the diversity jurisdiction
clause of the U.S. Constitution).
443 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
444 U.S. Const. art. III, §2.
445 Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 64 (1938).
446 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Coop., 78 S.Ct. 893 (1958); Hanna v. Plumber, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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therefore, arguably, substantive.
In characterizing immunity as merely procedural, the ICJ
further ignored the fact that immunity has elements of a
substantive rule apart from the outcome determinative analysis; it
is a specific application of the abstract notion of sovereignty and
goes to the very core of the state itself.44 7 In the U.K. case,
Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe,44 8 Lord Millet described immunity as
flowing from the state which jurisdiction is being asserted over: "It
is not a self-imposed restriction on the jurisdiction of its courts
which the United Kingdom has chosen to adopt. It is a limitation
imposed from without upon the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom itself."449 Further, a substantive rule, such asjus cogens,
must also have a procedural component if it is to be given effect.
The ICJ came to its conclusions by relying almost exclusively
on the practice of state courts. As the Court put it, "As between
Germany and Italy, any entitlement to immunity can be derived
only from customary international law, rather than treaty."4 50
Because only Italy, the Areios Pagos, and for a brief period, a U.S.
district court, recognized an exception to jurisdictional immunity
for jus cogens violations,4 5 ' it is unsurprising that the ICJ was not
compelled to find state practice supportive of an exception to
immunity. Italy was not able to show that binding international
custom had emerged, which was supported by state practice and
opinio juris (the legal sense of obligation).45 2 Customary
international law is formed slowly, by consent and consensus.45 3
As an early American court noted, no single nation can change
customary international law:
447 See Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, [2000] 1 WLR 1573.
448 Id.
449 Id. at 1588.
450 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 54 (Feb. 3).
451 Seeid. 71,76.
452 Id. 55.
453 As a general rule, states are only bound to abide by those rules of international
law to which they agree to be bound by-with exceptions for jus cogens. As the
Permanent Court of International Justice put it in the venerable Lotus decision, "The
rules of law binding upon States ... emanate from their own free will ..... S.S. Lotus
(France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), 44.
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The law is of universal obligation and no statute of one or two
nations can create obligations for the world. . . . the laws of
nations ... rests upon the common consent of civilized
communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any
superior power, but because it has been generally accepted as a
rule of conduct.454
The ICJ stated in the Asylum case that to constitute custom,
there must be some "constant and uniform" practice among
states.4 55 Further, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ
stated:
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not
necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of
customary international law on the basis of what was originally
a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would
be that within the period in question, short though it might be,
State practice, . . . should have been both extensive and virtually
unifor ... 456
One or two states' practice is not enough to show
"international custom" or a "general practice accepted as law"; 457
however, state judicial decisions were not the only corpus of law
the court should have considered. There is also the fact, as Judge
Yusuf wrote in dissent, that grave international crimes were
committed and that the fundamental values at the apex of
international law had been violated.4 58 Judge Cangado Trindade
lodged a lengthy and vociferous dissent in the case.459 It has been
noted elsewhere that "the original aim of state immunity law was
454 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 711 (1900) (quoting The Scotia, 81 U.S.
170, 188 (1871)).
455 Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (June 13, 1951)
(addressing the case in the context of regional custom).
456 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (F.R. Ger. v. Den.; F.R. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3, at para. 74 (Feb. 20).
457 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 33 U.N.T.S.
993.
458 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, T 17 (Feb. 3). (separate opinion of Judge Yusuf); see
discussion infra Part IX for other law the court should have considered.
459 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 91 (Feb. 3) (dissenting opinion of Judge Cangado Tridade).
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to enhance, not jeopardize, relations between states."460 Judge
Cangado Trindade scoffed at what he felt was the false emphasis
on the destabilizing effect of abrogating immunity. He argued:
In my understanding, what jeopardizes or destabilizes the
international legal order, are the international crimes, and not the
individual suits for reparation in the search for justice. In my
perception, what troubles the international legal order, are the
cover-up of such international crimes accompanied by the
impunity of the perpetrators, and not the victims' search for
justice. When a State pursues a criminal policy of murdering
segments of its own population, and of the population of other
States, it cannot, later on, place itself behind the shield of
sovereign immunities, as these latter were never conceived for
that purpose. Grave breaches of human rights and of
international humanitarian law, amounting to international
crimes, are not at all acts jure imperii. They are anti-juridical
acts, they are breaches of jus cogens, that cannot simply be
removed or thrown into oblivion by reliance on State immunity.
This would block the access to justice, and impose impunity. It
is, in fact, the opposite [that] should take place: breaches of jus
cogens bring about the removal of claims of State immunity, so
that justice can be done.461
As disappointing as the outcome may have been to human
rights activists, the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State decision
was not surprising. One would not expect, after all, for the ICJ to
hand down a ruling recognizing a limitation on sovereign
immunity and then still see sovereign states-who are the only
parties that can come before the ICJ-come back to the ICJ in the
future.46 2 Perhaps Article 34(1) has blinded the ICJ to the notion
that international law includes more diverse participants than the
states alone. Nevertheless, the Court did draw its conclusions
fairly narrowly and also emphasized that the Court was only
taking a snapshot of customary international law at the moment.46 3
460 Caplan, supra note 2, at 744.
461 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 39 (Feb. 3) (Cangado Tridade, J., dissenting).
462 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.
993 ("Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.").
463 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
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In other words, the ICJ left open the possibility of further
developments in the law of jurisdictional immunity. Judge
Koroma stressed this point in his separate opinion, where he stated
that:
[N]othing in the Court's Judgment today prevents the continued
evolution of the law on State immunity. In the past century, the
law on State immunity has evolved considerably in a manner
that has significantly circumscribed the circumstances in which
a State is entitled to immunity. It is possible that further
exceptions to State immunity will continue to develop in the
future. The Court's Judgment applies the law as it exists
today.464
For his part, Judge Bennouna agreed with the outcome of the
case but felt that immunity applied because Germany had already
conceded its responsibility for the unlawful acts.465 Presumably
there was some mechanism by which Mr. Ferrini and the other
plaintiffs could still seek to be compensated (though whether this
is really true is as yet uncertain). If, however, Judge Bennouna
reasoned, "Germany were to close all doors to such settlement ...
then the question of lifting its immunity before foreign courts in
respect of those same wrongful acts could legitimately be raised
again." 466
The ICJ erroneously discounted the changing nature of
sovereignty in general. The law on sovereignty has, in fact,
evolved, and it is only the inadequacy of legal analysis that has
failed to take into account jus cogens and fundamental human
rights law.467 Sovereignty is not born in the barrel of a gun. Its
legitimacy is derived from the peoples, and the Court's decision
dismissed the role of individuals who are, today, the ultimate
stakeholders in international law. As McDougal aptly noted, "It is
sometimes forgotten that human beings, and not legal artifacts, are
the only true participants in global public order and that nation-
states, like corporations, are only the creatures of human
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, T 91 (Feb. 3).
464 Id. (separate opinion of Judge Koroma), 2.
465 Id. (separate opinion of Judge Bennouna).
466 Id. T 25.
467 See Humes-Schulz, supra note 91, at 110-12.
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imagination and aspiration." 468  The ICJ also failed to appreciate
the writings of the most learned scholars, juris consults, who are a
source of international law.469 Significantly, the ICJ failed to
recognize a hard body of law changing the scope and reach of
sovereign immunity: the U.N. Charter.470 This article has
suggested that utilizing newer techniques of how international law
is made, rooted in communications theory and a deeper
appreciation of the global prescribing process, lawmakers may
approximate a more realistic depiction of the changing character
of international law, sovereign immunity, and emerging
humanitarian and human rights law.
X. Analyzing the Jus Cogens Exception to Sovereign
Immunity
As Christian Tomuschat, agent for Germany before the ICJ,
argued:
Although international law evolves in a creeping process similar
to the growth of common law, where judges take new directions
and open up new horizons, they are invariably required to act
lege artis in the (sometimes erroneous) belief that the rule
applied was developed in a constructive effort to synthesize
elements in force as component parts of the legal order. Judges
are not called upon to act with the explicit intention to create
new law. If they do so, they fail in their professional duties.4 7 1
Professor Tomuschat is no doubt correct in this regard, but it
must be recognized that judges alone do not decide what is
international law.472 The ICJ, and Judges like Lord Hoffman, use
an astigmatic view of international law.473 International law is
created by authoritative signals, such as those from the U.N.
Charter. International law is also created by the collective
468 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 49.
469 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(d), June 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993; see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820);
Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
470 See V.C.L.T., supra note 8, art. 18 ("A state is obliged to refrain from acts when
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.").
471 Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 1137.
472 See infra notes 481-84.
473 See supra notes 441, 461.
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communications and expressions of understanding signaled by
various interest groups such as the Red Cross and Amnesty
International, the multitude of national and transnational courts,
executives, and the all-important individuals who are the ultimate
stakeholders of international law. The ICJ considered
jurisdictional immunity only within the parameters of the doctrine
itself.4 74  It failed to analyze sovereign immunity within a
comprehensive framework that considers core principles of law,
such as sovereignty in general and its relationship to other fields of
international law, including human rights or to value-oriented
principles, such asjus cogens.4 75
Determining what is international law is a complex process.
As Reisman has pointed out, "the familiar tripartite division of
formal governmental institutions--executive, legislative and
judicial-does not so obviously exist in the international arena."47 6
The ICJ statute attempts to provide the international community
with a framework for determining the source of international law,
but it does not reconcile conflicting sources well. U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Cardozo wrote in New Jersey v. Delaware that
"[i]nternational law . .. has at times, like the common law within
[the United States], a twilight existence during which it is hardly
distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length the
imprimatur of a court attests its jural quality."47 7  Reisman,
however, noted in response, "[s]o few international cases reach
courts, that if Cardozo's judicial imprimatur were necessary, most
of international law would be consigned to the twilight zone and
beyond, indeed to Holland's very 'vanishing point of
jurisprudence."' 478
In Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the ICJ stressed state
practice because it felt there was no other compelling body of law
to draw upon.479 However, Lasswell, McDougal, and Reisman,
among other theorists of the New Haven School of Jurisprudence,
474 See id.
475 See id
476 Reisman, International Law-making, supra note 15, at 101.
477 New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934).
478 Reisman, International Law-making, supra note 15, at 103.
479 See supra text accompanying notes 438-42.
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developed a theory of international legal analysis to determine
whether a policy had been prescribed and hence should be
applied.48 0 They proposed the Communications Model (described
in more depth in Part I). In Reisman's words, "Put in simplest
terms, lawmaking or the prescribing of policy as authoritative for a
community is a process of communication. 4 8 1 The
Communications Model "liberates the inquirer from the limiting
and, in the international context, the distorting model of
positivism, which holds that law is made by the legislature."48 2
Under this model, communications of legal scholars, of advocacy
organizations, 4 83  and especially the resolutions of the U.N.
General Assembly are contributions to the process of law-making.
This expands the scope of relevant actors the ICJ could have
considered beyond simply states and the European judiciaries.
The legal grounds for abrogating immunity for jus cogens
violations are not, as Professor Tomuschat suggested, "mostly
based on fully understandable emotional reasons," but rather on
binding treaty law as well as customary law.484 In fact, the ICJ
ignored the most compelling body of hard law permitting one
state's refusal to grant another state immunity for human rights
abuse claims: the U.N. Charter. This contention is supported by
the ICJ's own statute. 485 The preamble of Chapter 1, Article 2 of
the U.N. Charter provides, "The Organization and its Members, in
pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance
480 See Reisman, International Law-making, supra note 15.
481 Id. at 105.
482 Id. at 107.
483 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, Germany v. Italy: The Right To Deny State Immunity
When Victims Have No Other Recourse, http://www.amnesty.org/
en/library/asset/IOR53/006/201 1/en/ce6Ob84b-e3a7-4266-alc3-
Ifb0277f039f/ior53006201 1en.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
484 Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 1140.
485 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.
993. Under the ICJ's statute, the decisions of state courts are of supplemental value,
unless they show customary international law-which is what the ICJ found. See id. art.
38(d) (stating, "subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law."). International conventions have primacy
with state jurisprudence and equality with custom, but because the former is not as
ephemeral, it is often the more respected body of law. Id art. 38(a).
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with the following principles."48 6 Article 1 of the Charter lists
"purposes and principles" of the U.N. and includes this language:
"To achieve international co-operation in ... promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction."" Further, Article 55 of the
U.N. Charter states that the U.N. and its members "shall
promote ... (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all .... 48 8 Article 56 then
states, "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement
of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
The U.N. Charter, including its provisions on sovereign
equality, must be interpreted consistently with the values
expressed in Chapter 1 and in the Preamble. The U.N. Charter is a
treaty under international law.490 The Vienna Convention provides
that treaties "shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose."4 91 Article 18 of
the Vienna Convention provides, "A State is obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty."49 Therefore, sovereign equality must be read in the
context of promoting human rights. A state should not be allowed
to draw benefit from the Principles of Article 2 when they are used
to shield a state from scrutiny for violating the very purposes the
U.N. Charter is meant to protect and promote.
Together, these provisions establish the impetus that states
must cooperate with each other to promote the fundamental
principles of the U.N. Charter, which explicitly include human
486 U.N. Charter art. 2.
487 Id. art. 1(3).
488 Id. art. 55.
489 Id. art. 56.
490 See V.C.L.T., supra note 8, art. 2(1)(a) (defining treaty as "an international
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation").
491 Id.art.31(1).
492 Id. art. 18.
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rights.493 This notion is further supported by the U.N. Declaration
of Friendly Relations.4 94 Although the U.N. General Assembly
does not have the power to make binding hard law, declarations (a
specific form of resolution) may still, in a sense, be politically
binding, and in any case, they are almost certainly expectation-
forming.495 Judge Lauterpacht made this observation in a 1955
ICJ Advisory Opinion, stating "[a] Resolution ... creates some
legal obligation which, however rudimentary, elastic and
imperfect, is nevertheless a legal obligation .... 49 6  This is true
with the Declaration of Friendly Relations.
The Declaration restates throughout that the U.N. system is
one built upon "the principle of sovereign equality."4 97 The
Declaration provides, however, that "States shall co-operate in the
promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all."4 98  Further, the
Declaration provides that members of the U.N. "have the duty to
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the United
Nations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Charter." 4 99  Those provisions include the ones described above.
Further, the Declaration provides, "Every State has the duty to
493 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 55, Preamble (reaffirming the United Nation's
committement to the protection of Human Rights).
494 See Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)
[hereinafter Declaration of Friendly Relations], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddalfl04.html.
495 See Reisman, International Law-making, supra note 15, at 102 (noting "As a
formal matter, the U.N. General Assembly was not endowed with lawmaking
competence. Nonetheless, a number of scholars have ventured that the General
Assembly 'sometimes' makes law, whether by a mysterious 'consensus,' as mystical as
transubstantiation, by 'instant' custom, or, as one learned professor apparently with
interests in culinary matters put it, by 'pressure-cooked custom."' But Reisman has also
described 'law' created by the General Assembly to be a weak, imperfect form of law, or
"lex simulata or lex imperects.") Id.
496 Concerning the Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and
Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion 1955 I.C.J.
67 (June 1, 1956) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht), at 55-56.
497 Declaration of Friendly Relations, supra note 494, pmbl.
498 Id at (b).
499 Id. at (d).
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promote through joint and separate action universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
accordance with the Charter." 00 Similarly, the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility-a further communication on point
generating expectations about international law norms-provides
that "Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the
international responsibility of that State."o0 The Draft Articles
also state, as the Ferrini court pointed out, "No state shall
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach [ofjus
cogens norms] ... , nor render aid or assistance in maintaining
that situation."502
The question the ICJ failed to address in Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State was whether these provisions of the U.N.
Charter, coupled with the Declaration on Friendly Relations and
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, imply
appropriateness for the application of human rights principles by
domestic courts over foreign states. One way of looking at the
issue, in other words, is to ask whether granting a state immunity
conflicts with the obligation to cooperate in the promotion and
protection of human rights, especially jus cogens norms. And
further, does granting a foreign state immunity render that state aid
and assistance in avoiding responsibility for internationally
wrongful acts? Does a forum state's ability to avoid sitting in
judgment of the international crimes of a foreign state allow the
forum state to, like Pontius Pilot, wipe its hands clean of
atrocities?.0 3  If it does, then by granting immunity to a foreign
state that has committed jus cogens violations, the forum state may
be undermining the purposes of the U.N. Charter and may be in
violation of international law. Instead, the ICJ gave every possible
deference to the twentieth century understanding of jurisdictional
immunity and of sovereignty.504 In Jurisdictional Immunities of
500 Id
501 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 356, art. 1(3).
502 Id. art. 41(2); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece
Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, T 17 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Judge Yusuf)
(discussing other pertinent documents).
503 See Matthew 27:24.
504 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 31-33 (Feb. 3).
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the State, the Court provided an understanding of jurisdictional
immunity that is dangerously close to creating a concept of
sovereignty so strong as to undermine the U.N. Charter, and in the
process, undermine the very purposes for which the ICJ was
established in the first place.
The ICJ also discounted the writings of scholars on this
complex matter. The writings of scholars are one of the
enumerated sources of law that the ICJ's statute directs the Court
to consider.sos McDougal produced some of the best analyses of
immunity's legitimacies and justifications for rational limitations
on it.50 McDougal noted, "Every State has an interest in
immunity, in the sense of noninterference with basic governmental
acts, and every State has an interest in how the larger community
allocates the competence to make and apply law among the
different States.""o' He also noted that in some cases "the common
interest of States requires severe limits upon State immunity."50 8
When states' interests are in conflict with international law,
particularly the preservation or promotion of the most fundamental
human rights, the legitimacy in granting immunity is weakened.
McDougal concluded that the interest of states in granting
reciprocal treatment to each other's acts is the promotion and
maintenance of an ordered world and relative peace.509 Therefore,
"when the acts of a State, whether public or private, are in
violation of the rules . . . of international law, there is no rational
ground for requiring the courts of another State to honor such
acts."" 0 Granting states immunity, in other words, communicates
505 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(d), June 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
506 See generally McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144.
507 Id. at 10.
508 Id. at 11.
509 Id. at 3, 13. See also Legal Adviser Testimony, supra note 205 ("The purpose
of sovereign immunity in modem international law is ... to promote the functioning of
all governments by protecting a state from the burden of defending law suits abroad
which are based on its public acts.").
510 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 13; cf
Tomuschat, supra note 222, at 1120 ("[l]ndividual remedies are highly inappropriate to
redress situations of mass injustice where evidence is frequently scarce and unreliable.
In this regard, the traditional mechanisms of settling reparations issues within an inter-
state context have proven to provide more suitable answers.").
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a tacit approval for state omnipotence when it encroaches on
human rights, and this is irrational and dangerous. The ICJ failed
to appreciate this understanding of the appropriate application of
immunity. Many other legal scholars support this position.
Humes-Schulz, for example, concluded that "[s]overeign
immunity should apply only to acts that are consistent with our
global legal ideals, and should be denied for acts that directly
contravene mandates of international law."." Further, she noted,
"Sovereign immunity that prevents a victim from seeking any
restitution seems wholly at odds with universal human
rights .... 12
On the other hand, evidence supporting an overly-deferential
concept of immunity as embraced by the ICJ is wanting. The U.N.
treaty on jurisdictional immunity is ambiguous and incomplete in
parts, suggesting that immunity is in a state of flux.513 It is true
that many states have found no immunity exception for jus cogens
violations, but some have, and in any case, this is just one
consideration among many. At the very core of the immunities
discourse is the fact that grave harms have been done, and states
must be held accountable.5 14  In 1928, the Permanent Court of
International Justice recognized the importance of compensation
for international wrongs, when it stated in Chorzow: "It is a
principle of international law that the breach of an engagement
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.""'
And further, that there is "a principle of international law that the
reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding
511 Humes-Schulz, supra note 91, at 108; cf Hazel Fox, In Defence of State
Immunity: Why the UN Convention on State Immunity Is Important, 55 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 399, 405 (2006) (arguing that sovereign immunity is necessary at the present stage
in the development of international law).
512 Humes-Schulz, supra note 91, at 112.
513 Seeid at 111-12.
514 See id at 110 ("The fundamental basis for the immunity doctrine-that a state
alone possesses the power to organize its internal affairs-gives the state the discretion
to treat its citizens as it wishes. Herein lies the tension between a world of sovereign
states and a world striving for the universal recognition of human rights norms: the
existence of human rights norms requires a state to treat its citizens with a basic level of
human dignity.").
515 Factory at Chorzow (Germ. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (July 26), at
55.
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to the damage which the nationals of the injured state have
suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international
law."5 16 Asserting jurisdiction over, or refusing to grant immunity
to, foreign states that commit internationally wrongful acts is in
keeping with this lofty principle.
XI. Conclusion
As one American court noted, "In the twentieth century the
international community has come to recognize the common
danger posed by flagrant disregard of basic human rights ....
Human rights norms are gaining force in international law vis-a-
vis sovereignty. Scholars have written that "traditional concepts of
sovereign immunity are under attack as never before";51 1 "[s]tate
equality is losing its irresistible force and the concept of
sovereignty is not as compelling as before";5 " and that sovereignty
"sits on a precarious perch."52 0 International law is gravitating
from a system focused on states and sovereignty to a system
focused on people and human rights. Jurisdictional immunity is
also following this pattern. As Judge Yusuf noted, the scope of
immunity has "been contracting over the past century, in light of
the evolution of international law from a State-centred legal
system to one which also protects the rights of human beings vis-
A-vis the State." 2 1 As sovereignty weakens relative to human
rights norms, jurisdictional immunity becomes less of a
compelling force.
Sovereign immunity has a legitimate and important role to
play in international relations and law, but it must be tempered
516 SHAW, supra note 7, at 95 (citing Chorzow (Germ. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 9 (July 26)).
517 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
518 Humes-Schulz, supra note 91, at 111.
519 Id. at 111-12 (citing ERNEST K. BANKAS, THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES IN DOMESTIC COURTS
255 (2005)).
520 Id. at 112 (citing William J. Aceves, Relative Normativity: Challenging the
Sovereignty Norm Through Human Rights Litigation, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 261, 262 (2002)).
521 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, T 21 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Judge Yusuf).
468 [Vol. XXXVIII
RESTRICTIONS ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
against superior norms of jus cogens. Courts, statutes, and treaties
have been treating sovereign immunity as the presumption that the
forum state must overcome. Perhaps this is the wrong way of
approaching the immunity question. A better model would be one
where a state claiming immunity had to show why it should be
entitled to immunity. McDougal made this very point; he
suggested, "States which seek immunity in particular instances
[should] have the burden of proving intolerable interference with
basic governmental activities."5 22 The scholar Rosalyn Higgins
made this same observation. She wrote, "An exception to the
normal rules of jurisdiction should only be granted when
international law requires-that is to say, when it is consonant
with justice and with the equitable protection of the parties. It is
not to be granted 'as a right."'5 23 Immunity must be understood as
a principle based on an ordered world community with the goal of
protecting responsible state actors: when states disrupt that order
and act in an irresponsible and criminal manner, those states must
lose their privilege of jurisdictional immunity.
Jurisdictional immunity is not a static legal concept but an
evolving one and in the last decade especially, the international
community has struggled to define its boundaries. As Lord Cooke
of Thorndon noted, "the boundaries of state immunity are not
permanently fixed."S2 4 They are ebbing. Jurisdictional immunity
"is not an immutable value in international law. Its adjustability to
the evolution of the international society, and its flexibility, are
evidenced by the number of exceptions built gradually into it over
the past century. . ."525 Jurisdictional immunity, a very old rule,
has come into conflict with newer value-oriented principles of
international law, like jus cogens norms. The ICJ has postponed
the emergence of a jus cogens exception to immunity, but the
customary international law on point will, like the common law,
522 McDougal, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 144, at 11, 16.
523 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, 3 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Judge Bennouna) (quoting
Rosalyn Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH.
INT'L L. REv. 265, 271 (1982)).
524 See Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, [2000] 1 WLR 1573, 14.
525 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It., Greece Intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 143, T 35 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Judge Yusuf).
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creep along regardless.
The development of a jus cogens exception will most likely
come from the jurisprudence of state courts,52 and they will likely
give greater consideration to the purposes and principles of the
U.N. Charter and its supporting documents. National courts were
the promoters of human rights long before international courts
existed, and there is a long tradition of state courts applying
international law.527 Nuremberg and Pinochet showed that
individuals lose sovereign protection by abusing sovereign
privileges.52 8 It makes sense for a state to lose its sovereign
protections (here, jurisdictional immunity), as well, when the state
abuses its sovereignty by engaging in human rights violations. It
is true that a state is not a person, but an amalgamation of
individual actors, some of whom will be perfectly innocent of any
wrongdoing. But entertaining civil judgments against a nation that
has committed the gravest breaches of international law is a strong
deterrent to future criminal acts.
This article attempts to show that sovereign immunity must be
considered within a holistic framework. Taken together, the
international community is communicating a clear expectation that
jurisdictional immunity should not be granted when states abuse
jus cogens norms. The evidence supporting an application of
immunity that does not conflict with the U.N. Charter's key
precepts, nor with jus cogens norms, is compelling. Sovereign
omnipotence has weakened vis-d-vis the individual in international
law and relations. Accountability has emerged as a recognized
goal in international law, and an important limitation on the
sovereign immunity doctrine is given for the protection of private
property-the commercial exception. There are other extremely
important rights in the world community that must be protected
and promoted. Waiver of immunity serves as insurance to the
526 Id. 43 ("The law relating to State immunity has historically evolved through
the decisions of domestic courts.").
527 See generally, RICHARD FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964) (discussing several instances in which the courts
of nation states enforce international law).
528 See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002
I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (finding that immunity for heads of state is customary international
law); BROWNLIE, supra note 32, at 597.
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global community for the potential abuses of sovereignty. In some
cases, it will be necessary to abrogate jurisdictional immunity in
order to avoid impunity for internationally wrongful acts and
breaches of the most fundamental human rights.
In conclusion, the focus used for the description and analysis
of modern international law must necessarily be realistic and
comprehensive. It must realize that international law, like all law,
is a response to the problems that emerge from the give and take
of social relations. For law to rationally respond to these
challenges it must clearly understand the nature of the challenge.
The blunderbuss invocation of the sovereignty symbol does not
help in defining the nature of the problem and the important and
subtle distinctions and differentiations that must be brought into
the calculus of reputable legal analysis. The comprehensive
context and the specification contextually of the problems that
realistically emerge must be further elucidated by refined tools
that guide observation and analysis. Those tools are to be found in
the utilization of Modern Communications Theory as applied to
the idea of international law-making. That process also includes
this refinement of the expectations codified in the evolving
prescriptive process.52 These tools permit a more realistic
determination what legal expectations are and how courts and
other authoritative decision makers might appropriately respond to
the problems that emerge within the framework of legal
expectations sustained by elements of authority and control at all
levels in the global environment.
529 See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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